# **Anthropocentrism Kritik**

## **1NC Shell**

#### human exploration and development of nature is based on the idea that humans are removed from the world – drives endless consumption in the name of civilization

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Paul & Dougald, THE DARK MOUNTAIN MANIFESTO

The myth of progress is founded on the myth of nature. The first tells us that we are destined for greatness; the second tells us that greatness is cost-free. Each is intimately bound up with the other. Both tell us that we are apart from the world; that we began grunting in the primeval swamps, as a humble part of something called ‘nature’, which we have now triumphantly subdued. The very fact that we have a word for ‘nature’ is [5] evidence that we do not regard ourselves as part of it. Indeed, our separation from it is a myth integral to the triumph of our civilisation. We are, we tell ourselves, the only species ever to have attacked nature and won. In this, our unique glory is contained. Outside the citadels of self-congratulation, lone voices have cried out against this infantile version of the human story for centuries, but it is only in the last few decades that its inaccuracy has become laughably apparent. We are the first generations to grow up surrounded by evidence that our attempt to separate ourselves from ‘nature’ has been a grim failure, proof not of our genius but our hubris. The attempt to sever the hand from the body has endangered the ‘progress’ we hold so dear, and it has endangered much of ‘nature’ too. The resulting upheaval underlies the crisis we now face. We imagined ourselves isolated from the source of our existence. The fallout from this imaginative error is all around us: a quarter of the world’s mammals are threatened with imminent extinction; an acre and a half of rainforest is felled every second; 75% of the world’s fish stocks are on the verge of collapse; humanity consumes 25% more of the world’s natural ‘products’ than the Earth can replace — a figure predicted to rise to 80% by mid-century. Even through the deadening lens of statistics, we can glimpse the violence to which our myths have driven us. And over it all looms runaway climate change. Climate change, which threatens to render all human projects irrelevant; which presents us with detailed evidence of our lack of understanding of the world we inhabit while, at the same time, demonstrating that we are still entirely reliant upon it. Climate change, which highlights in painful colour the head-on crash between civilisation and ‘nature’; which makes plain, more effectively than any carefully constructed argument or optimistically defiant protest, how the machine’s need for permanent growth will require us to destroy ourselves in its name. Climate change, which brings home at last our ultimate powerlessness. These are the facts, or some of them. Yet facts never tell the whole story. (‘Facts’, Conrad wrote, in Lord Jim, ‘as if facts could prove anything.’) The facts of environmental crisis we hear so much about often conceal as much as they expose. We hear daily about the impacts of our activities on ‘the environment’ (like ‘nature’, this is an expression which distances us from the reality of our situation). Daily we hear, too, of the many ‘solutions’ to these problems: solutions which usually involve the necessity of urgent political agreement and a judicious application of human technological genius. Things may be changing, runs the narrative, but there is nothing we cannot deal with here, folks. We perhaps need to move faster, more urgently. Certainly we need to accelerate the pace of research and development. We accept that we must become more ‘sustainable’. But everything will be fine. There will still be growth, there will still be progress: these things will continue, because they have to continue, so they cannot do anything but continue. There is nothing to see here. Everything will be fine.

#### The impact is the death of nature-- guarantees ecological and social violence on a massive scale through the categorical oppression of the non-human “object.”

Ahkin 10 [Mélanie, Monash University, “Human Centrism, Animist Materialism, and the Critique of Rationalism in Val. Plumwood’s Critical Ecological Feminism,” Emergent Australasian Philosophers, 2010, Issue 3, <http://www.eap.philosophy-australia.com/issue_3/EAP3_AHKIN_Human_Centrism.pdf>]

These five features provide the basis for hegemonic centrism insofar as they promote certain conceptual and perceptual distortions of reality which universalise and naturalise the standpoint of the superior relata as primary or centre, and deny and subordinate the standpoints of inferiorised others as secondary or derivative. Using standpoint theory analysis, Plumwood’s reconceptualisation of human chauvinist frameworks locates and dissects these logical characteristics of dualism, and the conceptual and perceptual distortions of reality common to centric structures, as follows. Radical exclusion is found in the rationalist emphasis on differences between humans and non-human nature, its valourisation of a human rationality conceived as exclusionary of nature, and its minimisation of similarities between the two realms. Homogenisation and stereotyping occur especially in the rationalist denial of consciousness to nature, and its denial of the diversity of mental characteristics found within its many different constituents, facilitating a perception of nature as homogeneous and of its members as interchangeable and replaceable resources. This definition of nature in terms of its lack of human rationality and consciousness means that its identity remains relative to that of the dominant human group, and its difference is marked as deficiency, permitting its inferiorisation. Backgrounding and denial may be observed in the conception of nature as extraneous and inessential background to the foreground of human culture, in the human denial of dependency on the natural environment, and denial of the ethical and political constraints which the unrecognised ends and needs of non-human nature might otherwise place on human behaviour. These features together create an ethical discontinuity between humans and non-human nature which denies nature’s value and agency, and thereby promote its instrumentalisation and exploitation for the benefit of humans.11 This dualistic logic helps to universalise the human centric standpoint, making invisible and seemingly inevitable the conceptual and perceptual distortions of reality and oppression of non-human nature it enjoins. The alternative standpoints and perspectives of members of the inferiorised class of nature are denied legitimacy and subordinated to that of the class of humans, ultimately becoming invisible once this master standpoint becomes part of the very structure of thought.12 Such an anthropocentric framework creates a variety of serious injustices and prudential risks, making it highly ecologically irrational.13 The hierarchical value prescriptions and epistemic distortions responsible for its biased, reductive conceptualisation of nature strips the non-human natural realm of non- instrumental value, and impedes the fair and impartial treatment of its members. Similarly, anthropocentrism creates distributive injustices by restricting ethical concern to humans, admitting partisan distributive relationships with non-human nature in the forms of commodification and instrumentalisation. The prudential risks and blindspots created by anthropocentrism are problematic for nature and humans alike and are of especial concern within our current context of radical human dependence on an irreplaceable and increasingly degraded natural environment. These prudential risks are in large part consequences of the centric structure's promotion of illusory human disembeddedness, self-enclosure and insensitivity to the significance and survival needs of non-human nature: Within the context of human-nature relationships, such a logic must inevitably lead to failure, either through the catastrophic extinction of our natural environment and the consequent collapse of our species, or more hopefully by the abandonment and transformation of the human centric framework.15 Whilst acknowledging the importance of prudential concerns for the motivation of practical change, Plumwood emphasises the weightier task of acknowledging injustices to non-humans in order to bring about adequate dispositional change. The model of enlightened self-interest implicit in prudentially motivated action is inadequate to this task insofar as it remains within the framework of human centrism. Although it acknowledges the possibility of relational interests, it rests on a fundamental equivocation between instrumental and relational forms of concern for others. Indeed it motivates action either by appeal to humans' ultimate self-interest, thus failing to truly acknowledge injustices caused to non-human others, remaining caught within the prudentially risky framework of anthropocentrism, or else it accepts that others' interests count as reasons for action- enabling recognition of injustices- but it does so in a manner which treats the intersection of others' needs with more fully-considered human interests as contingent and transient. Given this analysis, it is clear that environmental concern must be based on a deeper recognition of injustice, in addition to that of prudence, if it is to overcome illusions of human disembeddedness and self-enclosure and have a genuine and lasting effect.

#### Our alternative is to imagine global suicide—this throws into question the ideology of humanist value systems.

Kochi and Ordan 8 (Tarik, lecturer in the School of Law, Queen's University, Belfast, Northern Ireland, and Noam, linguist and translator, conducts research in Translation Studies at Bar Ilan University, Israel, 'An argument for the global suicide of humanity', *Borderlands*, December)

The version of progress enunciated in Hawking's story of cosmic colonisation presents a view whereby the solution to the negative consequences of technological action is to create new forms of technology, new forms of action. New action and innovation solve the dilemmas and consequences of previous action. Indeed, the very act of moving away, or rather evacuating, an ecologically devastated Earth is an example at hand. Such an approach involves a moment of reflection--previous errors and consequences are examined and taken into account and efforts are made to make things better. The idea of a better future informs reflection, technological innovation and action. However, is the form of reflection offered by Hawking broad or critical enough? Does his mode of reflection pay enough attention to the irredeemable moments of destruction, harm, pain and suffering inflicted historically by human action upon the non-human world? There are, after all, a variety of negative consequences of human action, moments of destruction, moments of suffering, which may not be redeemable or ever made better. Conversely there are a number of conceptions of the good in which humans do not take centre stage at the expense of others. What we try to do in this paper is to draw out some of the consequences of reflecting more broadly upon the negative costs of human activity in the context of environmental catastrophe. This involves re-thinking a general idea of progress through the historical and conceptual lenses of speciesism, colonialism, survival and complicity. Our proposed conclusion is that the only appropriate moral response to a history of human destructive action is to give up our claims to biological supremacy and to sacrifice our form of life so as to give an eternal gift to others. From the outset it is important to make clear that the argument for the global suicide of humanity is presented as a thought experiment. The purpose of such a proposal in response to Hawking is to help show how a certain conception of modernity, of which his approach is representative, is problematic. Taking seriously the idea of global suicide is one way of throwing into question an ideology or dominant discourse of modernist-humanist action. [3] By imagining an alternative to the existing state of affairs, absurd as it may seem to some readers by its nihilistic and radical 'solution', we wish to open up a ground for a critical discussion of modernity and its negative impacts on both human and non-human animals, as well as on the environment. [4] In this respect, by giving voice to the idea of a human-free world, we attempt to draw attention to some of the asymmetries of environmental reality and to give cause to question why attempts to build bridges from the human to the non-human have, so far, been unavailing. Subjects of ethical discourse One dominant presumption that underlies many modern scientific and political attitudes towards technology and creative human action is that of 'speciesism', which can itself be called a 'human-centric' view or attitude. The term 'speciesism', coined by psychologist Richard D. Ryder and later elaborated into a comprehensive ethics by Peter Singer (1975), refers to the attitude by which humans value their species above both non-human animals and plant life. Quite typically humans conceive non-human animals and plant life as something which might simply be used for their benefit. Indeed, this conception can be traced back to, among others, Augustine (1998, p.33). While many modern, 'enlightened' humans generally abhor racism, believe in the equality of all humans, condemn slavery and find cannibalism and human sacrifice repugnant, many still think and act in ways that are profoundly 'speciesist'. Most individuals may not even be conscious that they hold such an attitude, or many would simply assume that their attitude falls within the 'natural order of things'. Such an attitude thus resides deeply within modern human ethical customs and rationales and plays a profound role in the way in which humans interact with their environment. The possibility of the destruction of our habitable environment on earth through global warming and Hawking's suggestion that we respond by colonising other planets forces us to ask a serious question about how we value human life in relation to our environment. The use of the term 'colonisation' is significant here as it draws to mind the recent history of the colonisation of much of the globe by white, European peoples. Such actions were often justified by valuing European civilisation higher than civilisations of non-white peoples, especially that of indigenous peoples. For scholars such as Edward Said (1978), however, the practice of colonialism is intimately bound up with racism. That is, colonisation is often justified, legitimated and driven by a view in which the right to possess territory and govern human life is grounded upon an assumption of racial superiority. If we were to colonise other planets, what form of 'racism' would underlie our actions? What higher value would we place upon human life, upon the human race, at the expense of other forms of life which would justify our taking over a new habitat and altering it to suit our prosperity and desired living conditions? Generally, the animal rights movement responds to the ongoing colonisation of animal habitats by humans by asking whether the modern Western subject should indeed be the central focus of its ethical discourse. In saying 'x harms y', animal rights philosophers wish to incorporate in 'y' non-human animals. That is, they enlarge the group of subjects to which ethical relations apply. In this sense such thinking does not greatly depart from any school of modern ethics, but simply extends ethical duties and obligations to non-human animals. In eco-ethics, on the other hand, the role of the subject and its relation to ethics is treated a little differently. The less radical environmentalists talk about future human generations so, according to this approach, 'y' includes a projection into the future to encompass the welfare of hitherto non-existent beings. Such an approach is prevalent in the Green Party in Germany, whose slogan is "Now. For tomorrow". For others, such as the 'deep ecology' movement, the subject is expanded so that it may include the environment as a whole. In this instance, according to Naess, 'life' is not to be understood in "a biologically narrow sense". Rather he argues that the term 'life' should be used in a comprehensive non-technical way such that it refers also to things biologists may classify as non-living. This would include rivers, landscapes, cultures, and ecosystems, all understood as "the living earth" (Naess, 1989, p.29). From this perspective the statement 'x harms y' renders 'y' somewhat vague. What occurs is not so much a conflict over the degree of ethical commitment, between "shallow" and "deep ecology" or between "light" and "dark greens" per se, but rather a broader re-drawing of the content of the subject of Western philosophical discourse and its re-definition as 'life'. Such a position involves differing metaphysical commitments to the notions of being, intelligence and moral activity. This blurring and re-defining of the subject of moral discourse can be found in other ecocentric writings (e.g. Lovelock, 1979; Eckersley, 1992) and in other philosophical approaches. [5] In part our approach bears some similarity with these 'holistic' approaches in that we share dissatisfaction with the modern, Western view of the 'subject' as purely human-centric. Further, we share some of their criticism of bourgeois green lifestyles. However, our approach is to stay partly within the position of the modern, Western human-centric view of the subject and to question what happens to it in the field of moral action when environmental catastrophe demands the radical extension of ethical obligations to non-human beings. That is, if we stick with the modern humanist subject of moral action, and follow seriously the extension of ethical obligations to non-human beings, then we would suggest that what we find is that the utopian demand of modern humanism turns over into a utopian anti-humanism, with suicide as its outcome. One way of attempting to re-think the modern subject is thus to throw the issue of suicide right in at the beginning and acknowledge its position in modern ethical thought. This would be to recognise that the question of suicide resides at the center of moral thought, already. What survives when humans no longer exist? There continues to be a debate over the extent to which humans have caused environmental problems such as global warming (as opposed to natural, cyclical theories of the earth's temperature change) and over whether phenomena such as global warming can be halted or reversed. Our position is that regardless of where one stands within these debates it is clear that humans have inflicted degrees of harm upon non-human animals and the natural environment. And from this point we suggest that it is the operation of speciesism as colonialism which must be addressed. One approach is of course to adopt the approach taken by Singer and many within the animal rights movement and remove our species, homo sapiens, from the centre of all moral discourse. Such an approach would thereby take into account not only human life, but also the lives of other species, to the extent that the living environment as a whole can come to be considered the proper subject of morality. We would suggest, however, that this philosophical approach can be taken a number of steps further. If the standpoint that we have a moral responsibility towards the environment in which all sentient creatures live is to be taken seriously, then we perhaps have reason to question whether there remains any strong ethical grounds to justify the further existence of humanity. For example, if one considers the modern scientific practice of experimenting on animals, both the notions of progress and speciesism are implicitly drawn upon within the moral reasoning of scientists in their justification of committing violence against nonhuman animals. The typical line of thinking here is that because animals are valued less than humans they can be sacrificed for the purpose of expanding scientific knowledge focussed upon improving human life. Certainly some within the scientific community, such as physiologist Colin Blakemore, contest aspects of this claim and argue that experimentation on animals is beneficial to both human and nonhuman animals (e.g. Grasson, 2000, p.30). Such claims are 'disingenuous', however, in that they hide the relative distinctions of value that underlie a moral justification for sacrifice within the practice of experimentation (cf. LaFollette & Shanks, 1997, p.255). If there is a benefit to non-human animals this is only incidental, what remains central is a practice of sacrificing the lives of other species for the benefit of humans. Rather than reject this common reasoning of modern science we argue that it should be reconsidered upon the basis of species equality. That is, modern science needs to ask the question of: 'Who' is the best candidate for 'sacrifice' for the good of the environment and all species concerned? The moral response to the violence, suffering and damage humans have inflicted upon this earth and its inhabitants might then be to argue for the sacrifice of the human species. The moral act would be the global suicide of humanity.

## **Framework**

#### A neg ballot unlocks a broader worldview which politicizes and challenges the dominant notions environmental policy – only by disrupting the current paradigm of ecological management can we truly embrace a pragmatic approach necessary for sustainability and value

Reitan, 98 – PhD, Philosophy Professor at Oklahoma State University, an award-winning scholar and writer, peer reviewed (Eric, “Pragmatism, Environmental World Views, and Sustainability”, Electric Green Journal, UCLA Library, 1;9, Article 11)ahayes

Over the last several years, there has been an emerging discussion among environmental philosophers over the question of whether philosophical pragmatism can have a place of value in the environmental movement. Pragmatism is the distinctively American philosophical school which, roughly, holds that our ideas, theories, and worldviews should be examined and evaluated in the light of their impact on lived experience, according to how well they enable us to maneuver through experience successfully. Some worry that pragmatism’s tendency to root all values in subjective human experience undercuts the environmentalist’s claim that all of us ought to care about nature, because nature has an intrinsic value independent of the human activity of valuing**.** (Katz 1987) Others insist that pragmatism’s tendency to view individuals as inextricably connected to their field of experience--to their environment--can serve as the basis for environmental concern. (Parker 1996) What has not been explicitly noted in these discussions is that one of the key ideas advocated in current environmental theory--specifically, the idea that the contemporary consumerist worldview is largely to blame for our current environmental crisis, and any solution to that crisis must be driven by a change in worldview-- is itself an essentially pragmatic idea. I would like to explore the significance of this fact for those environmental theorists who embrace this idea. My suggestion is that, while not committed to all the traditional aspects of philosophical pragmatism, theorists who insist on the importance of cultivating a new worldview are implicitly committing themselves to some core pragmatic principles, and that the environmental movement will be strengthened by paying explicit attention to these principles and what they mean for environmental theory and practice. The Environmentalist Push for a New Worldview One of the most recurring themes in contemporary environmental theory is the idea that, in order to create a sustainable human society embedded in a flourishing natural environment, we need to change how we think about our relationship with nature. A simple change in public policy is not enough. Modest social changes--such as increased use of public transportation or a growing commitment to recycling--are not enough. Nor is environmental education that stresses the dangers of current practices and the prudence of caring for the earth. Even appeals to moral duty--obligations to future generations and to the fellow creatures with whom we share the planet--are insufficient**.** What is needed is a change in our worldview. More specifically, we need to change our view of nature and of our relationship with nature. Again and again, environmental thinkers press home this point. Aldo Leopold, one of the seminal figures of the environmental movement, advocates the adoption of a "land ethic" which "changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land-community to just plain member of it." (Leopold 1949) Deep ecologists such as Arne Naess advocate a process of deep questioning of our basic assumptions about nature and our relationship to nature, and they argue that unless we move away from "anthropocentric" conceptions of nature, and towards a more ecocentric view which accords value to all parts of the ecosphere, we will not want to do the things which need to be done to live sustainably in the natural world. (Naess 1988) Fritjof Capra, a research physicist and environmentalist, holds that the hope of the earth lies in a "new vision of reality," a "new ecological paradig**m**" currently emerging among scientists, philosophers, and other thinkers--one which views humans as part of a larger, interrelated whole. (Capra 1987) Thomas Berry insists that "to be viable, the human community must move from its present anthropocentric norm to a geocentric norm of reality and value." (Berry 1987) Psychologist Chellis Glendinning believes that Western culture imposes on us a mechanistic worldview that is fundamentally unsatisfying, leading to a "Techno-Addiction" that can be overcome only if we "integrate into our lives a new philosophy" that is "earth-based, ecological, and indigenous." (Glendinning 1992) While not all environmentalists embrace this clamoring for a new worldview, the trend is clear and unmistakable. Driving this trend is a growing suspicion that the prevailing modern worldview--a consumerist vision of life which denigrates nature to the status of property--is largely responsible for inspiring the unsustainable social and individual practices which threaten the health of our planet and ourselves. Thus, the only viable path to sustainability is the adoption of a new, environmentally friendly worldview. The Pragmatic Basis of Environmentalism The fundamental assumption here is that there exists an essential link between our outlook on the world and our behavior, one so strong that how we look at the world--our worldview--will largely determine what we do. The fundamental justification for changing our worldview, then, is that making such a change is the only realistic way to sufficiently change our harmful behavior. Anyone at all familiar with the history of American philosophy will recognize this assumption, and its concomitant justification of the environmental agenda, as essentially pragmatic--by which I mean that this mode of thinking received a central place in the American philosophical school known as pragmatism. In his 1906 lectures on pragmatism, William James (one of the central figures in American philosophical pragmatism) opened his remarks with the following quote from G.K. Chesterton: There are some people--and I am one of them--who think that the most practical and important thing about a man is still his view of the universe. We think that for a landlady considering a lodger it is important to know his income, but still more important to know his philosophy. We think that for a general about to fight an enemy it is important to know the enemy’s numbers, but still more important to know the enemy’s philosophy. We think the question is not whether the theory of the cosmos affects matters, but whether in the long run anything else affects them. (James 1991) The principle here, embraced by James as a starting point for his discussion of philosophical pragmatism, is that our worldview (or overall philosophy) has more direct impact on how we live our lives than any other single thing. And it is this principle which undergirds the current trend in environmental philosophy: according to a plethora of environmentalists, the only realistic way to move from the current unsustainable practices in human society to genuinely sustainable ones is to abandon the worldview that drives our unsustainable consumerist lifestyle and replace it with a worldview that inspires a caring and nurturing relationship with nature. To this extent at least, the majority of environmental theorists writing today are pragmatic in the philosophical sense. But if the ultimate justification for a shift in worldviews is pragmatic in this sense, then the various candidates for an "environmentally friendly" worldview should be evaluated in terms of their pragmatic effect, and the theoretic discussions that emerge among these rival worldviews should be mediated by pragmatic considerations. It is here that pragmatic philosophy can be especially helpful to environmentalism, by way of giving us criteria for evaluating worldviews and mediating theoretic discussions in terms of their pragmatic significance. Pragmatic Criteria for Evaluating Worldviews There are two principal pragmatic criteria for evaluating worldviews, both of which are articulated by James in his lectures on pragmatism. The first is what I will call the Criterion of Meaning, and it is expressed by James as the "pragmatic method," in the following way: The pragmatic method... is to try to interpret each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences. What difference would it practically make to any one if this notion rather than that notion were true? If no practical difference whatever can be traced, then the alternatives mean practically the same thing, and all dispute is idle. Whenever a dispute is serious, we ought to be able to show some practical difference that must follow from one side or the other’s being right. (James 1991) In short, the meaning of a worldview is to be evaluated in terms of the way of life which it tends to produce. From the standpoint of environmental philosophy, which calls for new worldviews in order to promote a harmonious relationship between humanity and nature, this criterion asks us to examine explicitly the effects of alternative worldviews on the sustainability of human-natural systems, and to distinguish them according to their practical impact on these systems. If two environmental worldviews have the same impact on the humannature relationship, they have the same environmental meaning (although they may have a different meaning in some other sphere of human endeavor). The second pragmatic criterion, what I will call the Criterion of Truth, is expressed by James in his pragmatic account of truth, in the following way: (Truth) means ... nothing but this, that ideas ... become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relations with other parts of our experience.... (James 1991) In other words, the ultimate test of a worldview’s truth is how well it enables us to function in the world of experience--not only how well it enables us to passively interpret our experience in a consistent way, but also how well it guides us through the active dimension of our lives. When evaluating a worldview, we must evaluate how well it works out in lived experience. Does it enable us to sustainably act in ways that are compatible with the dictates of the worldview itself and the rest of our experience? For example, a worldview which defines success as the accumulation of material wealth might be viewed as self-defeating, and hence false, if the pursuit of wealth destroys the natural resources on which wealth-accumulation depends. A worldview that cannot be lived out without running into contradictions or--as in the case above--without undermining the very preconditions for the possibility of living it out, is pragmatically false. (It is worth noting that according to this pragmatic criterion of truth, the label of "truth" is never final, since a belief that works in one experiential setting might no longer work given the advent of new experiences.) The Pragmatic Failure of the Modern Worldview Implicit in the widespread critique of the modern worldview is the observation that it has proven itself to be pragmatically false. While the modern consumerist worldview may have "worked" in the past, at least to some degree, it does not work anymore. The approaching environmental crisis can be solved only if we begin to act in ways that bring us into harmony with the ecosystems around us. We can realize such harmony only if we stop consuming more than nature can replenish--but the modern worldview defines success in terms of consumption, and thus inspires ever-increasing rates of resource depletion. We can find such harmony only if we stop contaminating natural systems more quickly than those systems can cleanse themselves--but the modern view of happiness is directly tied to the technological and industrial artifacts that are largely responsible for that contamination. We are likely to find such harmony only if harmony really matters to us--but the modern worldview is built upon a paradigm of dominating nature, of transforming and controlling nature to suit human preferences, not on realizing harmony with it. From this pragmatic framework, then, environmentalists are right to critique the prevailing modern worldview. The practical meaning of this worldview is activity that radically transforms the ecosphere, constructing human communities and habitats that are isolated from natural ecosystems and which disrupt not only the local ecosystems which they about, but also the atmosphere and hence the whole planet. That such practices are unsustainable is clear from the growing preponderance of scientific evidence. Human beings evolved in the natural environment that we are presently transforming. We evolved to be dependent upon that natural environment for our physical as well as psychological sustenance. Our actions amount to a destruction of much upon which we depend, and are therefore self-defeating in a very straight-forward way. The worldview that impels such actions is therefore pragmatically false. What I would like to do here is demonstrate, by way of an example, the value of pragmatic principles not only for the critique of the modern worldview, but also for guiding the on-going process of developing new, environmentally friendly alternatives. Perhaps the most useful role of pragmatism for current environmental philosophy lies in its capacity to identify which theoretic debates really matter, and to mediate these debates in terms of shared pragmatic goals--in particular, the goal of cultivating sustainable human-natural systems. With the urgency of the current environmental crisis, we cannot afford to get bogged down in theoretic disputes that mask a common mission and get in the way of making the practical changes that are so pressing.

#### Voting neg values more exclusively the human

Weston 9 (Anthony, “The incompleat eco-philosopher p. 11-13 <http://esotericonline.net/docs/library/Philosophy/Environmental%20philosophy/Ethics/Weston%20-%20The%20Incompleat%20Eco-Philosopher.%20Essays%20from%20the%20Edges%20of%20Environmental%20Ethics%20(2009).pdf)>

One problem, I argue, is that in an unnoticed but also almost tautological sense, this project remains ineradicably human-centered, despite its generous intentions. Not only is our standing never in question, but moral standing is extended to others by analogy to our own precious selves: to animals, maybe, on the grounds that they suffer as we do. But here is the most fundamental worry: Can an ethic of relationship actually remain so monocentric, homogeneous, single-featured? Might we not even wonder whether monocentrism almost by definition militates against real relationship? The eco-theologian Thomas Berry has declared that the essential task of environmental ethics is “to move from a world of objects to a community of subjects.” Berry’s almost Buberian language of subject-hood is not much heard in the environmental ethics we know. The phrase may call us up short. A true community of subjects must be an interacting whole of distinctive, nonhomogenized parts, in which no one set of members arrogates to themselves alone the right to gate-keep or even merely to welcome, however generously, moral newcomers. We are all “in” to start with. Thus Berry might be read as calling not merely for an alternative to anthropocentrism but for an alternative to the entire homogenizing framework of “centrism” itself. And this invitation, arguably, has very little to do with the received project of “expanding the circle” of moral consideration. What we actually need is a vision of multiple “circles,” including the whole of the world from the start. What I propose to call multicentrism thus envisions a world of irreducibly diverse and multiple centers of being and value—not one single moral realm, however expansive, but many realms, as particular as may be, partly overlapping, each with its own center. Human “circles,” then, do not necessarily invite expansion or extension, but rather augmentation and addition. In a similar pluralistic vein, William James challenges us to imagine this world not as a universe but as a “multiverse,” and thus a world that calls for (and, we might hope, calls forth) an entirely different set of skills—even, perhaps, something more like improvisation and etiquette, once again, in the all-too-serious place usually accorded ethics. Certainly it would have to be a world in which etiquette is in play: where collective understandings are negotiated rather than devised and imposed, however sympathetically, by one group of participants on the others. Introduction 13 All of these themes, I believe, are emerging from a wide variety of work both within and outside academic environmental ethics. My own emerging emphasis on the responsiveness of the world, and correspondingly how much a responsive world can be reduced by unresponsiveness on the other side; Cheney’s insistence on the constitutive role of what he calls “bioregional narrative,” co-constituted between human and more-than-human; our mutual friend Tom Birch’s argument for “universal consideration,” according to which moral “consideration” itself must, of necessity, keep itself considerately and carefully open to everything (there’s universality for you!). Many strands in ecofeminism, from a persistent and overdue attention to actual patterns and failures of human-animal relationships to Val Plumwood’s incisive exposure of the whole seamy conceptual underpinnings of “centering,” whether it be on and by males or Europeans or humans as a whole. Thomas Berry, David Abram, Gary Snyder, Paul Shepard, Sean Kane, and many others, cited and drawn upon in this paper, all speak of the human relation to nature in terms of negotiation and covenant rather than the philosophical unilateralism we have learned to expect. There is a movement here, in short: much more than a collection of scattered, hard-to-categorize complaints and idiosyncratic, extraphilosophical views, but a shared alternative vision of the world—and of the tasks of anything rightly called an “environmental ethic.” “Multicentrism” is not the perfect name for it—the chapter explores this problem too—but for the moment I think it will have to do.

#### The judge should vote to endorse a new critical pedagogy that falls under anti-anthropocentrism, called ecopedagogy. An ecopedagogy is rooted in creating a change within the academia that promotes ethical ecoloigical decision making

Kahn 10, graduated with a PhD from UCLA with a specialization in the philosophy and history of education, The Ecopedagogy Movement http://www.academia.edu/167226/Critical\_Pedagogy\_Ecoliteracy\_and\_Planetary\_Crisis\_The\_Ecopedagogy\_Movement

To correct existing forms of environmental education, Kahn calls for a critical ecopedagogy that is concerned with understanding how political economy and ideology produce the domination of nature. A critical ecopeda-gogy promotes a dynamic and complex definition of ecoliteracy that seeks to promote the idea that while we are hemmed in by the limits of and interpolated by destructive institutional forms, we can recognize and tran-scend these thresholds through measures of individual transformation and collective action, which aim for sustainable place-based relationships. Fleshing out his project, Kahn engages an emergent tripartite model of ecoliteracy that involves interlocking forms of functional/technical literacy(e.g., environmental science), cultural literacy (e.g., which cultural prac-tices/traditions further sustainability or hinder it?), and critical intersectional literacy focusing on the oppressive and liberatory potentials within political and economic structures. The project is related to normative goals of peace, social and environmental justice, and ecological well-being across species. Hence, Kahn seeks to transcend the limited framework of environmental education and to radicalize contemporary demands for sustainable develop-ment. He envisions a critical ecopedagogy that calls for analysis of ecological crisis and sustainable development to be mandated across the curriculum, that entire schools and communities come to focus on the problem of sustainability in all its myriad aspects, unlike present educational standards or policies. Yet he is wary of a too uncritical perception of the concept of “sustainable development” as a panacea to crisis since the concept itself is both nebulous and presently being utilized by all manner of corporations and states to legitimate ecologically unsustainable forms of globalization and imperialism.

#### Our ecopedagogy of the atrocities of the domination of nature perpetuated throughout history serves as a fight against the anthropocentric discourse that allows these systemic impacts to occur- learning an eco education to get the right ethical vision is the first step to an revolution. Kahn 10, graduated with a PhD from UCLA with a specialization in the philosophy and history of education, The Ecopedagogy Movement http://www.academia.edu/167226/Critical\_Pedagogy\_Ecoliteracy\_and\_Planetary\_Crisis\_The\_Ecopedagogy\_Movement

In addition, existing eco-education all too often lacks solid philosophica land ethical vision, needed to discern the dialectical relationships between nature and culture as well as to produce forms of consciousness that recog-nize the importance of a sustainable society that is inclusive of all forms of life. Kahn argues that part of the ecological crisis is the historical develop-ment of an anthropocentric worldview grounded in a sense that nature is a stuff of domination to be used by humans to meet their needs and purposes. Hence, a critical ecopedagogy needs to be rooted in a critique of the domina-tion of nature, of the global techno capitalist infrastructure that puts profit and market forces before humans, nature, and social goods, and of an unfettered Big Science and Technology that has instrumental and mechanis-tic perspectives on nature and that fails to see the need for a robust ecological science and appropriate technologies

#### **Current radical educators share various oppressions like anthropocentrism, and in order to have to most effective environmental education we need to merge these other forms of education to have the best pedagogy.**

**Bell & Russel 2k**- Beyond Human, Beyond Words: Anthropocentrism, Critical Pedagogy, and the Postructuralist Turn. Canadian Journal of Education, 25(3), 188-203.

To borrow from poststructuralism and yet remain within a critical pedagogy framework gives rise, of course, to inevitable tensions. Critical pedagogy continues earlier traditions such as “progressive,” “radical,” “emancipatory,” and “liberation” pedagogies whose root metaphors are distinctly modern(see Bosers, 1993a,pp.25-26.). Poststructuralism, however, brings into play postmodern perspectives and methods of analysis that challenge modernist notions of, for example, freedom, history and progress, rationality, and subjectivity. Nevertheless, poststructuralism has influenced critical theories of education for over a decade, generating fruitful discussions about epistemic certainty, master narratives, stable signifiers, and essentialized identities. As environmental educators, we have found poststructuralism, in concert with the many other theoretical perspectives informing critical pedagogy (e.g., feminism, Marxism, antiracism, Freudian theory, popular education), to be useful in our efforts to come to terms with dominant assumptions about education. We recognize, furthermore, that poststructuralism as it is taken up within critical pedagogy is only one manifestation of poststructuralist approaches in human sciences. The term poststructuralist applies to a range of (not necessarily coherent) theoretical perspectives. The fact that the term is used differently in Australia, the United States, and Canada further complicates matters (Luke & Luke, 1995,p.359). Despite important differences, however, forms of poststructuralism share certain assumptions about language, meaning and subjectivity. A common factor is the analysis of language as “ the place where social and political consequences are defined and contested” (Weedon. 1987, pp. 20-21). Contested and mutually reinforcing (Bullard, 1993; Gaard, 1997; Lahar, 1993; Sturgeon, 1997). Thus, if critical educators wish to resist various oppressions, part of their project must entail calling into question, among other things, the instrumental exploitive gaze through which we humans distance ourselves from the rest of nature (Carlson, 1995). For this reason, the various movements against oppression need to be aware of and supportive of each other. In critical pedagogy, however, the exploration of questions of race, gender, class, and sexuality has proceeded so far with little acknowledgement of the systemic links between human oppressions and the domination of nature. The more-than-human world and human relationships to it have been ignored, as If the suffering and exploitation of other beings and the global ecological crisis were somehoe irrelevant. Despite the call for attention to voices historically absent from traditional cannons and narratives (Sadovnik, 1995, p. 316), nonhuman beings are shrouded in silence. This silence characterizes even the work of writers who call for a rethinking of all culturally positioned essentialisms.

#### Critical pedagogy is at the heart of anthropocentrism, and states that humans are animals, but somehow above all other known animals.

Bell & Russel 2k- Beyond Human, Beyond Words: Anthropocentrism, Critical Pedagogy, and the Postructuralist Turn. Canadian Journal of Education, 25(3), 188-203

Take, for example, Freire’s (1990) statements about the differences between “Man” and animals. To set up his discussion of praxis and the importance of “naming” the world, he outlines what he assumes to be shared, commonsensical beliefs about humans and other animals. He defines the boundaries of human membership according to a sharp, hierarchical dichotomy that establishes human surperiority. Humans alone, he reminds us, are aware and self-conscious beings who can act to fulfill the objectives they set for themselves. Humans alone are able to infuse the world with their creative presence, to overcome situations that limit them, and thus demonstrate a, “decisive attitude towards the world” (p.90). Freire (1990, pp. 87-91) represents other animals in terms of their lack of such traits. They are doomed to passively accept their given, their lives “totally determined” because their decisions belong not to themselves but to their species. Thus whereas humans inhabits a “world” which they crate and transform and from which they can separate themselves, for animals there is only habitat, a mere physical space to which they are “ organically bound.”To accept Freire’s assumptions is to believe that humans are animals only in a normal sense. We are different not in degree but in kind, and though we might recognize that other animals have distinct qualities, we as humans are somehow more unique. We have the edge over other creatueres because we are able to rise above monotonous, species-determined biological existence. Change in the service of human freedom seems to be our primary agenda. Humans are thus cast as active agents whose very essence is to transform the world-as if somehow acceptance, appreciation, wonder, and reverence were beyond the pale. This discursive frame of reference is characteristic of critical pedagogy. The human/animal opposition upon which it rests is taken for granted, its cultural and historical specificity not acknowledged. And there lies the problem. Like other social constructions, this one derives its persuasiveness from its “seeming facticity and from the deep investments individuals and communities have in setting themselves off from others” (Britzman et al., 1991, p. 91). This becomes the normal way of seeing the world, and like other discourses of normalcy, its limits possibilities of taking up and confronting inequities( see Britzman 1995). The primacy of the human enterprise is simply not questioned.

#### Within the academia there currently is a hybrid being formed, compiling of anthropocentrism, and critical pedagogy to create a space for ethical knowledge.

Bell & Russel 2k- Beyond Human, Beyond Words: Anthropocentrism, Critical Pedagogy, and the Postructuralist Turn. Canadian Journal of Education, 25(3), 188-203

A complementary vein of enquiry is being pursued by environmental researchers and educators critical of the privileging of science and abstract thinking in education. They understand learning to be mediated not only through our minds but also through our bodies. Seeking to acknowledge and create space for sensual, emotional, tacit, and communal knowledge, they advocate approaches to education grounded in, for example, nature experience and environmental practice (Bell, 1997; Brody, 1997; Weston, 1996). Thus, whereas both critical pedagogy and environmental education offer a critique of disembodied thought, one draws attention to the ways in which the body is situated in culture (Shapiro, 1994) and to “the social construction of bodies as they are constituted within discourses of race, class, gender, age and other forms of oppression” (S. Taylor, 1991, p. 61). The other emphasizes and celebrates our embodied relatedness to the more than human world and to the myriad life forms of which it is compromised (Payne, 1997; Russell & Bell, 1996). Given their different foci, each stream of enquiry stands to be enriched by a sharing of insights. Finally, with regard to the poststructionalist tune in educational theory, ongoing investigations stands to greatly enhance a revisioning of environmental education. A growing number of environmental educators question the empirical-analytical tradition and its focus on technical and behavioural aspects of curriculum( A. Gough, 1997; Robottom, 1991). Advocating more interpretive, critical approaches , these educators contest the discursive frameworks (e.g., positivism, empiricism, rationalism) that mask the values, beliefs, and assumptions underlying information, and thus the cultural and political dimensions of the problems being considered(A, Gough, 1997; Huckle, 1999; Lousley, 1999). Teaching about ecological processes and environmental hazards in a supposedly objective and rational manner is understood to belie the fact that knowledge is socially constructed and therefore partial (A. Gough, 1997; Robertson, 1994; Robottom, 1991; Stevenson, 1993).

#### Scholars and educators within poststructuralism, critical pedagog, and environmental thought all are sharing methods, ideas, and values.

Bell & Russel 2k- Beyond Human, Beyond Words: Anthropocentrism, Critical Pedagogy, and the Postructuralist Turn. Canadian Journal of Education, 25(3), 188-203

In challenging anthropocentrism, the two of us find cause for hope in the fact that our critique can be seen as compatible with the work of many proponents of critical pedagogy. Specifically, attention to local contexts, lived relationships, and embodied learning within critical pedagogy matches similar considerations within environmental thought and education. The poststructuralist emphasis on societal narratives and language practices, already well developed in critical pedagogy, is likewise being taken up by environmental scholars and educators. What strikes us as most auspicious then, is the potential for shared conversations, with insights from one field sparking unasked questions and opening up unexplored pathways for another.

#### When critical pedagogy and a place based ecological education work together we can solve several crises that they couldn’t solve alone, using a ecopedagogy.

**Kahn 10**, graduated with a PhD from UCLA with a specialization in the philosophy and history of education, The Ecopedagogy Movement http://www.academia.edu/167226/Critical\_Pedagogy\_Ecoliteracy\_and\_Planetary\_Crisis\_The\_Ecopedagogy\_Movement

For example, per written accounts, the heads of the Zoo School do not have the students pose problems into the history and nature of zoos—a highly problematical social and environmental institution (Rothfels, 2002)— or become active in the fight against the Apple Valley zoo’s own sordid history and policies. As regards the latter project, a worthwhile education adventure would be to have students become involved in banning dolphins as a zoo exhibit (hardly a native species to Minnesota) and to have them returned to either a sanctuary or non-domesticated oceanic habitat. Instead, as of 2006, one could pay $125 to swim with the zoo’s dolphins, a practice generally condemned by marine ecologists (Rose, 1996) and environmental-ists/animal rightists (Watson, 1995) alike as both inhumane and beyond the bounds of good environmental stewardship. Further, the Apple Valley zoo’s Wells Fargo Family Farm claims to foster environmental literacy experiences for Zoo School students “to explain and…learn about how food gets from farms to tables.” 8 Yet students could alternatively work for a critical literacy that seeks to understand how the implosion of corporate marketing and ideology into the zoo structures its educational program. That is, while the Zoo School presently offers relatively idealized experiences of life on a family farm, it could instead aim for literacy into how to organize opposition to such questionable practices as the natu-ralization of a corporate “family farm,” as well as in how to demand answers from responsible parties as to why high-ranking executives of a leading corporate agribusiness like Cargill presently sit on the zoo’s board of direc-tors. Additionally, students could learn to read the corporate farm exhibit against the grain in order to politically problematize why the zoo has failed to create educational encounters on the ecological benefits of a vegan diet, when it instead at least tacitly supports as sustainable and conservationist-minded the standard American meat-based diet and the ecologically damag-ing factory farming that presently supports it.

## **Links**

### General

#### **Current Environmentalism isn’t based in rational thought and doesn’t gain mass support, we need to change our views for a more effective alternative**

Richards, 11 – researcher of philosophy at Haverford College, PA Timothy, Beyond Environmental Morality: Towards a Viable Environmental Ethic, The International Journal of Environmental, Cultural, Economic and Social Sustainability, Volume 7, Number 2, 2011

Environmentalism, which draws on modern environmental ethics for its conceptual foundations, is in need of a new narrative. Hitherto, the story has been framed primarily in terms of curbing destruction. The story goes that we have a moral imperative to act now so that we do not kill species, so that we do not keep poisoning the water, polluting the air, sterilizing the land, and so that we do not wreck the world for our children. These claims are undoubtedly true, although being cast in such negative, prohibitive terms creates an impasse for their actualization both conceptually and in practice. With such a guiding lens, it is little wonder that we as a species have yet to adopt environmentalist theory and praxis. Environmental activists and ethicists, afflicted by the contemporary environmental morality, believe they must inflict the environmentalist burden on as many others as possible to reach a critical mass/turning point in consciousness to enlighten humankind about the environment. Again, it is probably true that a critical mass needs to adopt and embody environmental consciousness to affect genuine change, though doomsday forecasting and gloomy outlooks are not exactly the kind of narratives that are likely to light an inspirational fire for collective action to save the planet and its life forms. More pointedly, a merely oppositional consciousness cannot go far enough beyond the current industrial realities and milieu to envision a completely different alternative. More pointedly, environmental ethics presupposes that there is an entity called 'nature' that we humans are differentiated from and have an obligation towards as outside actors. This is what I want to call environmental dualism, which holds humans as separate from, rather than a part of, nature; and, in keeping with the aforementioned contemporary environmental morality, as a force that is destroying this entity called 'nature.' Both environmental ethicist and activist worldviews operate on a narrative that can be roughly summarized as follows: 'nature,' which we are despoiling, was at one point, prior to humans, a pristine wilderness where paradisiacal conditions reigned, a view critics refer to as the Arcadian myth. The story goes that this prelapsarian state in which humans existed hannoniously with nature was thrown out of balance, firstly with the advent of agriculture and the resultant rise of civilizations. Later, the industrial revolution and the consumer capitalist economy served to exacerbate our situation, the unfettered greed and waste of which are currently imperiling all life support systems on planet Earth. If only we would begin to help the environment by reining in our species' destructive tendencies, we could begin to reset the original balance. I hold that such views are textbook cases of the contemporary environmental morality and environmental dualism that are currently endemic to most members of our species, not excluding environmental ethicists and activists. It is my view that both the environmental dualism and the contemporary environmental morality that characterize modem environmental ethical thought are inaccurate for two reasons. Firstly, humans are a part of nature - we are organic beings, all of our actions occur within a larger ecological framework, and we reside within these ecosystems. Our creations are natural - houses and factory dormitories are no less natural products than are birds' nests and beehives. Our economy, to the extent that it stems from us as natural beings, is natural as well. Though our human creations and economies may operate by methods contra to life broadly speaking and compromise our fellow natural beings and their habitats in the process, these are historical contingencies that can, and I would argue must, be changed.

#### **Humans are characterized by speciesism and anthropocentrism whether they know it or not.**

Kochi & Ordan, 08, -Senior Lecture of Law @ University Sussex; Research fellow of translation studies @ university of saarlan

Tarik & Noam, An Argument for the global suicide of humanity, borderlands E-journal volume 7 Number 3, 2008

One dominant presumption that underlies many modern scientific and political attitudes towards technology and creative human action is that of ‘speciesism’, which can itself be called a ‘human-centric’ view or attitude. The term ‘speciesism’, coined by psychologist Richard D. Ryder and later elaborated into a comprehensive ethics by Peter Singer (1975), refers to the attitude by which humans value their species above both non-human animals and plant life. Quite typically humans conceive non-human animals and plant life as something which might simply be used for their benefit. Indeed, this conception can be traced back to, among others, Augustine (1998, p.33). While many modern, ‘enlightened’ humans generally abhor racism, believe in the equality of all humans, condemn slavery and find cannibalism and human sacrifice repugnant, many still think and act in ways that are profoundly ‘speciesist’. Most individuals may not even be conscious that they hold such an attitude, or many would simply assume that their attitude falls within the ‘natural order of things’. Such an attitude thus resides deeply within modern human ethical customs and rationales and plays a profound role in the way in which humans interact with their environment.

#### **The idea of sustainability is impossible to achieve the attempts to achieve this through this idea will only result in failure**

Mentz, 12 – Prof of English @ St. John’s University Steve, After Sustainability, Theories and Methodologies, 586-587

IT SEEMED UKE A GOOD IDEA WHILE IT LASTED, BUT WE SHOULD HAVE KNOWN IT COULD NOT LAST. THE ERA OF SUSTAINABILITY IS OVER. Behind our shared cultural narratives of sustainability sits a fantasy about stasis, an imaginary world in which we can trust that what- ever happened yesterday will keep happening tomorrow. It's been pretty to think so, but it's never been so. In literary studies, we name this kind of fantasy pastoral. Such a narrative imagines a happy, stable relation between human beings and the nonhuman environment. It seldom rains, mud doesn't clog our panpipes, and our sheep never run away while swains sing beautiful songs to coy shepherdesses. In this sustainable green world, complicated things fit into simple packages, as literary criticism has recognized, from William Empson's "pastoral trick" (115) to Greg Gerrard's "pastoral ecology" (56-58). This green vision provides, in Gerrard's phrase, a "stable, enduring counterpoint to the disruptive energy and change of human societies" (56). That's the dream toward which sustainability entices us. To be sustainable is to persist in time, unchanged in essence if not details. 'That’s not the human experience of the nonhuman world. Remember the feeling of being wet, like King Lear, "to the skin" (Mentz, "Strange Weather"). Changing scale matters, and local variation does not preclude global consistency, but the feeling of 'the world on our skin is disruptive. Our environment changes constantly, unexpectedly, often painfully.

### Link - Apocalyptic Rhetoric

#### Their use of apocalyptic rhetoric creates a form of ecopolitics where anything is justified and the root cause is never addressed to ensure contol

Schatz 12, Prof of English @ Binghamton

(Joe, The Importance of Apocalypse: The Value of End-of-the-World Politics While Advancing Ecocriticism, The Journal of Ecocriticism, p 23-24)

Outside of charges of terrorism, direct activists face a host of criticism from academics on the left who should otherwise be their allies. For instance, Timothy Luke uses a Foucauldian analysis to explain how attempting to protect the environment is merely an acute form of biopower. He explains, “The application of enviro-discipline expresses the authority of eco-knowledgeable, geo-powered forces to police the fitness of all biological organisms[.] … Master concepts, like ‘survival’ or ‘sustainability’ … empower these masterful conceptualizers to inscribe the biological/cultural/economic order of the Earth’s many … environments, requiring continuous enviro-discipline to guarantee ecological fitness” (1999: 146). The implication is that “the ways in which the environment is constructed as in crisis … and who then is authorized to save it become important for understanding the ways that the truth about the environment is made” (Rutherford 291). For biopower to operate effectively it must have the legitimacy to speak. Such legitimacy, however, pushes out divergent voices who otherwise refuse to subscribe to the letter of the law. This critique readily applies to activists like Watson who harness the language of international law, alongside apocalyptic threats, to escape prosecution for interfering with commerce. The transfer of agency from individuals to international bodies such as the International Whaling Commission is criticized by theorists like Luke. Eric Darier, Research Associate at the Centre for the Study of Environmental Change at Lancaster University, points out how “current environmental concerns could be seen as an extension of ‘biopolitics’, broadened to all life-forms … [through an] ‘ecopolitics’ … [that] is the most recent attempt to extend control … to the entire planet[.] … In this context, the promotion of ecocentrism by deep ecology, for example, can be seen as not only a critique of prevalent, increasing instrumental control of the natural world, but as inserting itself very well into the new normalizing strategy of an ecopolitics” (Darier 23). Anything is justified in the name of saving the environment because it is a question of our very survival. Here we find the logic of things like resource wars that strive to secure geo-political interests in order to get others to clean up their acts in the name of environmental security4 . From this perspective the mobilizing potentials of apocalyptic imagery can influence populations for the purposes of war instead of positive ecological awareness. This fear causes such critics to refrain from utilizing descriptions of omnicide while simultaneously criticizing the most effective tactic activists on the frontlines have.

### Link- Climate Change Discourse

#### It is inherent in the human condition to constantly search for the technological fix, when in reality that avoids the problems that need to be prioritized the most-anthropocentrism cannot solve this problem.

Crist 07 (Eileen Crist, Eileen Crist received her Bachelor's degree from Haverford College in sociology in 1982 and her doctoral degree from Boston University in 1994, also in sociology, with a specialization in life sciences and society, 2007, Beyond the Climate Crisis: A critique of climate change discourse, 29-55)

While the dangers of climate change are real, I argue that there are even greater dangers in representing it as the most urgent problem we face. Framing climate change in such a manner deserves to be challenged for two reasons: it encourages the restriction of proposed solutions to the technical realm, by powerfully insinuating that the needed approaches are those that directly address the problem; and it detracts attention from the planet’s ecological predicament as a whole, by virtue of claiming the lime- light for the one issue that trumps all others. Identifying climate change as the biggest threat to civilization, and ushering it into center stage as the highest priority problem, has bolstered the proliferation of technical proposals that address the speciﬁc challenge. The race is on for ﬁguring out what technologies, or portfolio thereof will solve “the problem.” Whether the call is for reviving nuclear power, boosting the installation of wind turbines, using a variety of renewable energy sources, increasing the efficiency of fossil-fuel use, developing carbon-sequestering technologies, or placing mirrors in space to deﬂect the sun’s rays, the narrow character of such proposals is evident: confront the problem of greenhouse gas emissions by technologically phasing them out, superseding them, capturing them, or mitigating their heating effects. In his The Revenge of Gaia, for example, Lovelock brieﬂy mentions the need to face climate change by “changing our whole style of living. But the thrust of this work, what readers and policy-makers come away with, is his repeated and strident call for investing in nuclear energy as, in his words, “the one lifeline we can use immediately.”" In the policy realm, the ﬁrst step toward the technological ﬁx for global warming is often identiﬁed with implementing the Kyoto protocol. Biologist Tim Flannery agitates for the treaty, comparing the need for its successful endorsement to that of the Montreal protocol that phased out the ozone-depleting CFCs. “The Montreal protocol,” he submits, “marks a signal moment in human societal development, representing the ﬁrst ever victory by humanity over a global pollution problem.”" He hopes for a similar victory for the global climate-change problem. Yet the deepening realization of the threat of climate change, virtually in the wake of stratospheric ozone depletion, also suggests that dealing with global problems treaty-by-treaty is no solution to the planet's predicament. Just as the risks of stratospheric ozone depletion have been followed by the dangers of a long underappreciated climate crisis, so it would be naive not to anticipate another (perhaps even entirely unforeseeable) catastrophe arising after the (hoped-for) resolution of the above two. Furthermore, if greenhouse gases were restricted successfully by means of technological shifts and innovations, the root cause of the ecological crisis as a whole would remain unaddressed. The destructive patterns of production, trade, extraction, land-use, waste proliferation, and consumption, coupled with population growth, would go unchallenged, continuing to run down the integrity, beauty, and biological richness of the Earth. Industrial-consumer civilization has entrenched a form of life that admits virtually no limits to its expansiveness within, and perceived and large sidestepped in climate-change discourse, with its single-minded quest for a global-warming techno-ﬁx.” Instead of confronting the forms of social organization that are causing the climate crisis—among numerous other catastrophes—climate-change literature often focuses on how global warming is endangering the culprit, and agonizes over what technological means can save it from impending tipping points. The dominant frame of climate change funnels cognitive and pragmatic work toward speciﬁcally addressing global warming, while muting a host of equally monumental issues. Climate change looms so huge on the environmental and political agenda today that it has contributed to downplaying other facets of the ecological crisis: mass extinction of species, the devastation of the oceans by industrial ﬁshing, continued old-growth deforestation, topsoil losses and desertiﬁcation, endocrine disruption, incessant development, and so on, are made to appear secondary and more forgiving by comparison with “dangerous anthropogenic interference” with the climate system.

### Link – Disease

#### Their understanding of disease fails to understand a larger narrative of the nonhuman “disease” and stops scientific advancement – turns the aff

Yong 6/11 – Mphil in Biochemistry from University College London

(Ed, “Does our anthropocentric view of genetics keep us from scientific discovery?,” Genetic Literacy Project, 6/11/14)

In a normal laboratory setting, one can usually find a human behind the bench with the pipette and bacteria in the petri dish. But for much of evolution microbes were actually running the show. In the laboratory that is life, bacteria have been inadvertently experimenting with each other for millions of years before humans came into existence. In fact, Ed Yong writes at Aeon, humans are just bystanders in the epic battle between microbes. And, the diseases they give us, which we view as a microbe’s purpose for living, is likely nothing more than a chance twist of fate. Is this anthropocentric view of our world keeping science from discovering and pursuing experiments and ideas that could more efficiently unravel the workings of biology? Some scientists think yes. For example, instead of focusing on the few varieties of the streptococcus bacteria that cause human infection, why are we not looking at the thousands of varieties that coexist in our noses and airways? A growing number of studies show that our anthropocentric view is sometimes unjustified. The adaptations that allow bacteria, fungi and other pathogens to cause us harm can easily evolve outside the context of human disease. They are part of a microbial narrative that affects us, and can even kill us, but that isn’t about us.

### Link – Environmental Dualism

#### The aff is rife with examples of environmental dualism which justifies environmental exploitation in the name of progress and makes environmental destruction and climate change inevitable

Hine and Kingsnorth 9

(Dougald and Paul, Unicivilisation: The Dark Mountain Manifesto)

The myth of progress is founded on the myth of nature. The first tells us that we are destined for greatness; the second tells us that greatness is cost-free. Each is intimately bound up with the other. Both tell us that we are apart from the world; that we began grunting in the primeval swamps, as a humble part of something called ‘nature’, which we have now triumphantly subdued. The very fact that we have a word for ‘nature’ is [5] evidence that we do not regard ourselves as part of it. Indeed, our separation from it is a myth integral to the triumph of our civilisation. We are, we tell ourselves, the only species ever to have attacked nature and won. In this, our unique glory is contained. Outside the citadels of self-congratulation, lone voices have cried out against this infantile version of the human story for centuries, but it is only in the last few decades that its inaccuracy has become laughably apparent. We are the first generations to grow up surrounded by evidence that our attempt to separate ourselves from ‘nature’ has been a grim failure, proof not of our genius but our hubris. The attempt to sever the hand from the body has endangered the ‘progress’ we hold so dear, and it has endangered much of ‘nature’ too. The resulting upheaval underlies the crisis we now face. We imagined ourselves isolated from the source of our existence. The fallout from this imaginative error is all around us: a quarter of the world’s mammals are threatened with imminent extinction; an acre and a half of rainforest is felled every second; 75% of the world’s fish stocks are on the verge of collapse; humanity consumes 25% more of the world’s natural ‘products’ than the Earth can replace — a figure predicted to rise to 80% by mid-century. Even through the deadening lens of statistics, we can glimpse the violence to which our myths have driven us. And over it all looms runaway climate change. Climate change, which threatens to render all human projects irrelevant; which presents us with detailed evidence of our lack of understanding of the world we inhabit while, at the same time, demonstrating that we are still entirely reliant upon it. Climate change, which highlights in painful colour the head-on crash between civilisation and ‘nature’; which makes plain, more effectively than any carefully constructed argument or optimistically defiant protest, how the machine’s need for permanent growth will require us to destroy ourselves in its name. Climate change, which brings home at last our ultimate powerlessness.

### Link – Economy

#### The aff’s view of the economy places nature as an entity in need of stewardship that guarantees total environmental collapse and disasters – turns the aff

Marshall and Bormann 10 - ecologists

(Bruce and Frank, “The Earth has its own set of rules: Our view of nature is based on our human desire for more, and that economic model is broken,” Los Angeles Times, 1-2)

But by far our most prevalent view of nature derives from a rudimentary human desire for more. This is the basis of the economic model that currently directs our relationships with one another and with our environment. It has produced stupendous human population growth and dramatic, deleterious effects on nature. Recognizing these effects, efforts have been marshaled to change the self-serving economic model with notions of Earth "stewardship," eloquently advanced decades ago by then-Interior Secretary Stewart Udall, and, most recently, to infiltrate the economic model with "ecosystem services" by assigning monetary values to functions performed by the Earth that are beneficial to people. All of these views are fundamentally and dangerously flawed, because all are anthropocentric. They begin and end with humans. This isn't the way the Earth works. The Earth has its own set of rules, solidly grounded in laws of physics and chemistry and emergent principles of geology and biology. Unlike our economic model, these are not artificial constructs. They are real, and they govern. Earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, hurricanes, tornadoes, 100-year floods, massive wildfires and disease epidemics are dramatic examples of parts of nature, neither all service nor all harm, creating and destroying, and governed by rules that are indifferent to humans. Our anthropocentric economic model for interacting with the world ignores and is proving to be incompatible with Earth's rules, and is therefore on a direct collision course with them.

### Link – Energy Security/State/Policy Affs

#### The Aff’s search for energy security ensures violence on marginalized communities and exploits the Earth

Simpson 13 – lecturer International studies @ South Australia University

(Adam, “Challenging Injustice through a Critical Approach to Energy Security: A

Central Component of Environmental Security,” Australasian Political Studies Association, p 2)

The search for energy security is one of the key dynamics that is re-shaping politics and governance in the twenty-first century, particularly throughout Asia and the emerging economies of the global South. With increasing rates of energy consumption predicted for many regions there is a need to critically re-assess the concept of energy security and its central focus on the needs of nation-states. Although theoretical approaches to human and environmental security have shifted the referent object away from the state the importance of energy to the military and economic power of modern industrialised states has ensured that the concept of energy security has remained almost exclusively state-centric. As with other aspects of security, however, the state is often not the best means of pursuing energy security for marginalised individuals or communities, particularly in non-democratic states. Furthermore, state-centric approaches do not allow either an emphasis on more localised communities or a normative emphasis on injustice. Various existing approaches to critical security studies have adopted these shifts but without a focus on the significance of environmental factors and relationships, which are so precarious for many communities in the South. In the pursuit of national energy security states often engage in large-scale energy projects, but these frequently result in insecurity for already marginalised communities who live in the vicinity of the projects. The impacts of this energy exploitation are likely to be felt most acutely in the environmental capital and processes that the communities rely on, such as food, water and less destructive local energy sources. It should also be acknowledged, however, that the social and political context within which these communities exist plays a significant role in determining the specific outcomes of the projects, and whether, indeed, they proceed at all. A critical environmental security approach that acknowledges the relationship between these communities and both their environment and the socio-political structures they inhabit is therefore best placed to capture the significance of these impacts.

### Biodiversity Discovery

#### **The discovery of new marine species for the benefit of humans is anthropocentric because it refuses to recognize that organisms have intrinsic value for their own sake.**

Anton, 97 – director of policy and international llaw @ University of Melbourne

Donald K., Columbia Journal of Transnational Law

In order to appreciate the need for new international law to provide greater protection to marine biological diversity beyond the continental shelf and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), it is necessary to appreciate the value of such diversity, why we care about conserving it, and why threats to it are a matter of concern. From some ethical points of view all forms of life, and the habitats that support them, can be considered intrinsically valuable for their own sake. Under this premise, it follows that protection and preservation ought to follow as a matter of course. However, excepting certain philosophical, religious or cultural systems, the value of biological diversity overwhelmingly has been viewed from the narrow position of5 worth to humans. Of course, this presents problems for the protection of biological diversity, because it has recognized value that cannot be calculated in dollar terms. Further, under current accounting systems, the cost of losing biodiversity is ordinarily shifted to society rather than internalized by private actors responsible for the loss. The problem is even more acute in the case of marine biodiversity found beyond national jurisdiction because of its common nature. Consequently, systems for valuing biodiversity need to use monetary valuation as one tool among many. The debates surrounding the CBD have suffered from this myopic economic view of the value of biodiversity. Instead of focusing on the widespread protection and conservation of ecosystems, species, and genetic variability, the debates have primarily involved access to biological diversity and rights to profits generated through the exploitation of genetic material.

#### **Anthropocentrists only choose to explore the environment when there is a possibility for that specific thing to help them like “rare herb theory”**

Katz 10 – prof of philosophy @New Jersey Institute of Technology

Eric, Nature as Subject: Human Obligation and Natural Community, 1997

Anthropocentric and instrumental arguments in favors of preservationist policies can be developed in a series and arranged in order of increasing plausibility. First, it is argued that any particular species of plant or animal might prove useful in the future. Alastair Gunn calls this position the “rare herb” theory. According to this theory, the elimination of any natural entity is morally wrong because it closes down the options for any possible positive use. A point frequently raised in discussions of this problem is that the endangered species we are about to eliminate might be the cure of cancer. Of course, it is also possible that it will cause cancer, the specific effects of any plant or animal species might be harmful as well as beneficial. Because we are arguing from a position of ignorance, it is ludicrous to assert either possibility as certain, or to use either alternative as a basis for policy? A better argument is used by Paul and Anne Ehrlich: the metaphor of the airplane rivets. “The Ehrlichs tell a parable of an airplane passenger watching as a mechanic removes some of the rivets from the wing assembly of the plane he is boarding. When asked what he is doing, the mechanic replies that for reasons of economy, the airline is cutting down on the number of rivets used on each plane; some of the rivets are being removed and used on other planes. The procedure is not dangerous, continues the mechanic, since up to this point, no planes have been lost. The point of the parable is that although the elimination of individual species might not be directly harmful to human welfare, the aggregate elimination of many species probably will be. It is thus in the interests of humanity to remove as few “rivets” as possible, to preserve natural species even, when they are “nonresources”.

### Mapping

#### Mapping conforms to the borders of the ocean, dividing up nature in boundaries is anthropocentric – it assumes that the earth is just a “resource” to be divided for human consumption, rather than deserving of value in its own right.

Rollstone, 95 – prof of philosophy @ Colorado State University

Holmes, “A New Century for Natural Resource Management”, http://www.ecospherics.net/pages/Global.htm

There is one Earth: on it are 178 sovereign nations, a politically fragmented world. “The Earth is one but the world is not”. True, the one Earth is plural in its landmasses and supports myriads of diverse ecosystems, species, and peoples. Still, the really divisive troubles arise among the world states. The national sovereignties are not well adapted for harmonious relations with the Earth commons. The rights of nations, and the rights as claimed by citizens of these political states, are not well aligned with ecology and geography. In the 20th century, the commons problem became transnational; at the turn of tire millennium it is becoming global. Our citizenship in nations is not well synchronized with our residence in geographic places, not with our sense of global dwelling on our home planet. Those in the G-7 nations who emphasize the earnings model tend to recommend to the G-77 nations that they produce more, often offering to help them by investment that can also be productive for the G-7 nations. Those in the G-77 nations realize that the problem is sharing too. A continually growing production can be as much part of the problem as part of the solution. One way to think of a circular pie chart of English goods is that this is planet Earth, and we do not have any way of producing a bigger planet. Maybe too, Earth is not just a big pie to be eaten up. Earth is valuable on its own and has produced fauna and flora that are worth construing for what they are in themselves. The astronaut Michael Collins recalled being: “I remember so vividly… what I saw when I looked back at my fragile home – a glistening, inviting beacon, delicate blue and white, a tiny outpost suspended in the black infinity. Earth is to be treasured and nurtured, something precious that must endure” The UN Secretary- General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, closed the Earth Summit: “the Spirit of Rio must create a new mode of civic conduct It is not enough for a man to love to his neighbor, he must also learn to love his world”. Neither is thinking merely anthropocentrically of Earth as a big resource t be exploited for human needs, a pie to be divided up for human consumption. Rather, earth s a precious thing in itself because it is home for us all; Earth is to be loved, as we do a neighbor, for intrinsic integrity. The center of focus is not people, but the biosphere. But valuing the whole Earth and responsibilities to it are unfamiliar and need philosophical analysis

#### The idea that certain groups of people “own” parts of the natural world is anthropocentric

Orton, 03 – Deep ecologist and philosopher (David, Key Deep Ecology Ideas)

Deep ecology opposes the idea of “private property” in nature. As Arne Naess said: “The ideology of ownership of nature has no place in an ecosophy.” I have written about “usufruct use” instead of so-called private ownership of the natural world. This means that there is the “right of use”, but one is ultimately responsible and accountable to some form of ecocentric governance much wider than human society. Nature must remain a Commons and not be privatized.

### Marine Archaeology

#### Marine archaeologists are extremely dependant on and obsessed with technology.

Flatman, 07 – Member of Institute of Archaeology @ University of College London

Joe, The Origins and Ethics of Maritime Archaeology

Divers are, for various reasons, obsessed with equipment. They would argue safety, social anthropologists of a Freudian bent might argue hierarchical masculine jockeying (see Ransley, 2005) as well as sexual fetishism. This technological obsession can be both for diving techniques and in particular for diving equipment (listen to any set of divers talking ‘shop’ and you will inevitably hear the conversation turn to this or that piece of ‘kit’). Among maritime archaeologists the obsession tends to lean towards either methodological practices of survey, excavation and conservation, or high-end ‘hardware’ such as towed sonar arrays, magnetometers, sub-bottom profilers or remotely-operated/autonomous underwater vehicles. This ‘obsession’ with technology is a frequent complaint made by terrestrial archaeological colleagues and non-archaeologists alike as regards maritime archaeology, and is reflected in the special language of the community. As an example, at a recent gathering of maritime archaeologists one speaker(jokingly) compared the use of such technology to the famous Falklands War quote by journalist Brian Hanrahan about (British) aircraft leaving and returning from a mission that he ‘counted them all out, and counted them all back in again’. Given the presence of Argentine colleagues in the room such analogies were insensitive at best, but such language is by no means unusual. Maritime archaeologists appear hopelessly in love with their ‘toys’ to many external observers, blinded by the ‘exciting’ possibilities of refinement and experimentation to the exclusion of a broader sense either of archaeological understanding or social responsibility. One reason for this technologically obsessed, gadget-driven focus of maritime archaeology would appear to be the formalized origins of the sub-discipline and its institutional timeline, which is frequently quite distinct from the humanistic, anti-quarian origins of terrestrial archaeology. Those aspects of maritime archaeology most closely aligned to technology are allied to the recent (post-World War II) history of the marine sciences rather than archaeology, and should be analyzed as such (see for instance van Keuren, 2001; Dennis, 2003; Doel, 2003; Oreskes, 2003; Manley and Foley, 2004). Maritime archaeology as a discipline in this sense effectively derives from the conjunction of three distinctive socio-cultural perspectives in the 1960–1970s

#### The Affirmative’s Dependence on Technology Detaches Humanity from the Environment.

Bodain and Naess 88 (Arne, Norwegian philosopher and the founder of [deep ecology](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_ecology). Former professor at the [University of Oslo](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Oslo), founder of the deep ecology movement. “Simple in Means Rich in Ends An interview with Arne Naess in Deep Ecology for the 21st Century, ed. George Sessions, p. 32)

S.B.: Some people, particularly in this country, have great faith that, once we've perfected our computer technology and can process all the available information, we'll be able to make informed decisions. You, on the other hand, have spoken about the importance of admitting that we don't know, admitting our ignorance in the face of the complexity of nature, and at the same time be willing to trust our intuition and stand up and say, "l know in my heart that this is what we need to do." Naess: I think that, one hundred and fifty years ago, in government decision making in America and in Europe, more information was available in proportion to the amount needed than is available today. Today, we are using thousands of new chemicals, and we don’t know their combined long-range effects.We interfere a million times more deeply in nature than we did one hundred years ago, and our ignorance is increasing in proportion to the information that is required. S.B.: In other words, many more questions are being raised, but fewer answers are being provided. NAESS: Exactly. One indication is that, if you take the number of scientific articles published each year with neat, authoritative conclusions and divide it by the number of questions posed to scientists by responsible people concerned with the consequences of our interventions in nature, )you will find that the quotient approaches zero. That is, the number of questions is becoming indefinitely large very quickly, whereas the number of answers is increasing very slowly indeed. And, in any case, within a hundred years, we'll run out of paper to print the billion articles that supply the relevant answers needed each year. S.B.: So you don't think that, if we just perfect our science and technology, our answers will somehow catch up with the number of questions being raised ? NAESS: On the contrary, technology is more helpless than ever before because the technology being produced doesn't fulfill basic human needs, such as meaningful work in a meaningful environment.Technical progress is sham progress because the term technical Progress is a cultural, not a technical term.Our culture is the only one in the history of mankind in which the culture has adjusted itself to the technology, rather than vice versa. In traditional Chinese culture, the bureaucracy opposed the use of inventions that were not in harmony with the general cultural aims of the nation. A vast number of technical inventions were not used by the populace because it was simply not permitted. Whereas here we have the motto, "You can't stop progress," you can't interfere with technology, and so we allow technology to dictate cultural forms.

### Link – Aquacultures

#### Aquacultures are the epitome of human domination of the environment that promotes overfishing and destruction of habitats

#### Kheraj 13 – assistant prof of history @ York University

(Sean, “Nature’s Past Canadian Environmental History”)

Canada’s fisheries have been subjects of controversy and sites of tension for over 200 years. On the east coast, small-scale, inshore fisheries (the norm since the seventeenth century) gave way to large-scale, scientifically-managed commercial fisheries. Technological advances, globalizing market structures, and an ever-increasing reliance on experts, created a context in which the Department of Fisheries and Oceans shifted the purpose of fisheries from meeting human needs to meeting maximum sustainable yields and total allowable catches. The result was the collapse of the North Atlantic cod fishery in the early 1990s. On the west coast, the defence of the salmon fishery against hydroelectric development on the Fraser River in the middle of the nineteenth century is one bright spot in a story of over-fishing, habitat loss, and the negative side-effects of commercial-scale aquaculture. The artificial state border between Canada and the United States in the Salish Sea, which did not reflect the migratory lives of pacific salmon, created the conditions for unmanageable fish banditry. Inland, freshwater fisheries have experienced similar stories of over-harvesting, threats to fish habitat, and denial of Native resource rights. Around the Great Lakes, First Nations experienced competition from non-native commercial fishermen as early as the 1830s, spent much of the late nineteenth century resisting efforts by the Ontario government to eliminate their traditional rights, and fought a series of legal battles during the twentieth century to regain autonomy over their fisheries.

### Link – Icebreakers

#### Icebreakers contribute to climate change’s positive feedback lops and fracture habitats

Leitzell 12 – PhD in biology @ University of Southern California

(Katherine, “Are icebreakers changing the climate?,” National Snow and Ice Date Center)

Arctic sea ice reflects most of the sun’s rays, helping to keep the Arctic and the whole Northern Hemisphere cool. Open water has a lower albedo —or reflectivity—than sea ice, and so it absorbs more heat from the sun. Researchers have found that as Arctic sea ice melts in summer, leaving more areas of open water, the open water absorbs more of the sun’s energy, warming the water and melting more ice. This is one of the positive feedback loops that scientists say could lead to increased warming and sea ice loss in the Arctic. NSIDC scientist Walt Meier said, “Even in the summer, when the ice is melting, sea ice reflects at least 50 percent of the sun’s energy. The ocean only reflects about 10 percent of the sun’s energy, and 90 percent is absorbed, warming the ocean and the atmosphere.” It makes sense that a strip of open water left by an icebreaker would absorb more heat from the sun, and melt away the sea ice along that trail. Meier said, “It’s certainly true locally, that the open water in the wake of an icebreaker absorbs more of the sun’s energy than the ice around it.” But what is the effect on the ice cover as a whole?

### Link – Methane Hydrates

#### Methane Hydratess are too fragile to be accessed – Drilling for them destabilizes sea floor stability, accidental methane release, and collapse of drilling platforms

Mielke 2K – Prof Biological Anthropology @ Kansas

(James, Methane Hydrates: Energy Prospect or Natural Hazard?, CRS Report for Congress, p 3)

Sea floor stability and safety are two important issues related to gas hydrates. Sea floor stability refers to the susceptibility of the sea floor to collapse and slide as the result of gas hydrate disassociation. The safety issue refers to petroleum drilling and production hazards that may occur in association with gas hydrates in both offshore and onshore environments. The safety issue affects current oil and gas production as well as being of concern to possible hydrate development in the future. Throughout the world, oil and gas drilling is moving into regions where safety problems related to gas hydrates may be anticipated. Oil and gas operators have recorded numerous drilling and production problems attributed to the presence of gas hydrates, including uncontrolled gas releases during drilling, collapse of well casings, and gas leakage to the surface. In the marine environment, gas leakage to the surface around the outside of the well casing may result in local sea floor subsidence and the loss of support for foundations of drilling platforms. These problems are generally caused by the dissociation of gas hydrate due to heating by either warm drilling fluids or from the production of hot hydrocarbons from depth during conventional oil and gas production. Subsea pipelines may also be affected by loss of sea floor support from hydrates destabilized by warming. Hazards arise because gas hydrates are only quasi-stable; if the temperature is increased at a fixed pressure or the pressure decreased at fixed temperature, or both temperature increased and pressure decreased, it is easy to pass out of the stability regime of hydrates. The hydrate structure encases methane at very high concentrations. A single unit of hydrate, when heated and depressurized, can release 160 times its volume in gas. It is possible that both natural and human-induced changes can contribute to in-situ gas hydrate destabilization, which may convert an offshore hydrate-bearing sediment to a gassy water-rich fluid, triggering sea floor subsidence and catastrophic landslides. Evidence implicating gas hydrates in triggering sea floor landslides has been found along the Atlantic Ocean margin of the United States.2 The mechanisms controlling gas hydrate-induced sea floor subsidence and landslides are not well known, but these processes may release large volumes of methane to the Earth’s oceans and atmosphere. Methane is a “greenhouse” gas, 10 times more effective than carbon dioxide in the process believed by many to cause climate warming.

### Link–OTEC

#### OTEC needs to be reevaluated before put into action. The idea of placing these plants without knowing the full consequences of the action is an extremely anthropocentric mindset that needs reconsidering.

Hammar 14 **(**Linus Hammar, PhD Student, Energy and Environment DIVISION OF ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS ANALYSIS. Linus Hammar works on ecological risk assessment of renewable ocean energy, 2014, Power from the same new ocean marine renewable energy and ecological risks, Department of Energy and Environment <http://publications.lib.chalmers.se/records/fulltext/196091/196091.pdf>)

Although the potential environmental effects of OTEC plant construction and operation were evaluated in the 1980s as part of earlier OTEC development, recent OTEC efforts have led to the re-examination of the issues involved. During the intervening years we have significantly increased our understanding of the oceans, and our ability to observe and model the marine environment has improved markedly. For example, OTEC environmental assessments have traditionally included the effects of discharging deep seawater, with its elevated levels of dissolved inorganic nutrients and dissolved inorganic carbon, and depleted levels of dissolved oxygen, into the upper water column. However, the role of trace elements in controlling marine primary production rates is now widely accepted, and their natural vertical distribution in the ocean needs to be considered. Our expanded understanding of ocean biogeochemistry also makes environmental assessment more complicated. For example, discharges of deep seawater within the photic zone of the ocean, but below the surface mixed layer, should result in photosynthetic production that would remove both dissolved nutrients and dissolved carbon dioxide at approximately the same stoichiometric ratio as they are elevated in deep seawater; thus, the only large-scale related environmental impact would involve the fate of the resulting photosynthetically produced organic matter. Similarly, our improved knowledge of marine physical chemistry allows a better understanding of OTEC’s potential impact on the ocean’s inorganic carbon chemistry. For example, the reduction in pressure of deep seawater as it is brought to the surface, and the increase in temperature due to OTEC heat exchange, will both lead to an increase in the deep water’s pH; opposite effects will occur in the shallow seawater used by OTEC. Determination of the net effect will require modeling using predicted pumping rates for warm and cold seawater, the planned intake and discharge depths and temperatures, the inorganic carbon chemistry at the specific site, and recently refined inorganic carbon equilibria data. Ecological data (e.g., primary productivity, the biomass of various trophic levels, biota attraction to floating objects, etc.) should also be updated with the results from more contemporary studies. Additional factors that should be examined include electromagnetic effects of cabling, alterations in the bio-physical coupling of water column as a result of the discharge plume, potential harmful algal bloom development, and low-frequency noise production. Moreover, new ocean observation techniques such as gliders and AUVs allow large areas of the ocean to be monitored in 3-D for extended periods of time. Similarly, new marine modeling techniques, such as regional ocean modeling systems (ROMS), allow OTEC plumes to be studied in the context of a 3-D dynamic ocean, including such features as internal tides and mesoscales eddies, and allow assimilation of 3-D data to improve model performance. As an early step in these efforts, we have used HOT time-series data to determine patterns of seasonal variability in the upper ocean (warm water intake and discharge zone) and in the deep ocean (cold water uptake) near the site for the proposed Kahe Point, Oahu OTEC demonstration plant.

#### OTEC mutates environments into unnatural forms that aren’t conducive to life

Hammar 14 – PhD student of energy and environmental studies @ Chalmers University of Technology

(Linus, Power from the Brave New Ocean: Marine Renewable Energy and Ecological Risks, PhD thesis, 14)

OTEC plants differ much from other marine renewables. Because the conversion efficiency is low, large quantities of water have to be pumped in and out of the facility. This massive exchange of water between different depths raises several concerns. If the discharge water is released at considerate depth (in the aphotic zone) impacts are likely to be small for single units, but if discharge water reaches the upper layers, as a cause of inadequate design or unforeseen water movements, the altered water properties (temperature, salinity, acidity) and contents of nutrients and possibly heavy metals may have ecosystem level impacts (Pelc and Fujita 2002, Boehlert and Gill 2010). Particularly the possible intrusion of nutrient rich water into coastal ecosystems, such as coral reefs, has been considered worrisome. The possible effect has recently been addressed by modeling works. Considering a 100 MW OTEC plant off Hawaii, with a discharge depth of 70 m, Grandelli et al. (2012) concluded that ecological effects of nutrient displacements would be negligible. In a similar study, Jia et al. (2012) likewise concluded that changes to the surface water would be negligible, but that nutrient levels would double below discharge depth (70 m). It was argued that possible ecological effects further depend on whether the currents at this depth would dilute the nutrient concentration before phytoplankton growth takes place (Jia et al. 2012). The water exchange of OTEC may also mean that marine animals will be entrained through the system and impinged at the intake screens (Pelc and Fujita 2002, Comfort and Vega 2011). At the warm water intake (at about 20 m depth) plankton, including eggs and larvae, are likely to be entrained. Considering that the intake flow is about 400 m3 /s losses can be large if the intake is located where abundances are high. The level of impingement depends on screen mesh size and intake water approach speed. With large mouthpiece diameters most fish and larger animals will be able to avoid impingement. At the cold water intake, however, screens cannot be easily maintained and are therefore rarely considered. Here, deep sea organisms of any size may easily be entrained. Samples from an OTEC pilot plant deep water intake have shown entrainment of anglerfish and several other deep sea animals (Comfort and Vega 2011). Without effective deep water intake screens OTEC full scale plants may have unforeseen effects on deep sea fauna. Lastly, it has been argued that if ammonia or other toxic solutions are used as working fluid in OTEC plants, accidental leakages may have local effects (Pelc and Fujita 2002).

### Link- Earth Fertilization

#### Earth Fertilization changes the ecological community and offsets the balance of nature. Once they start the impact is irreversible, and the mindset won’t be changed until too late, prefer the alternative then the plan.

Chisholm Falkowski and Cullen 08 (Sallie W. Chisholm, Paul G. Falkowski, John J. Cullen, Chisholm is in the Department of Environmental Engineering, January 9 2008 Discrediting Ocean Fertilization, Science Compass Public Forum)

The proponents’ claim that fertilization for carbon sequestration would be environmentally benign is inconsistent with almost everything we know about aquatic ecosystems. Fertilization changes the composition of the phytoplankton community (10-13); it is precisely this feature that gives it the potential for increasing carbon ﬂux to the deep sea. Correspondingly, the oceans’ food webs and biogeochemical cycles would be altered in unintended ways. We have learned this from inadvertent enrichment of lakes and coastal waters with nutrients from agricultural runoff, something we have been trying to reverse for decades. Fertilization advocates try to counter these concerns by arguing that the oceans have already been compromised. Indeed, we have known for decades (20) that human activities have resulted in depleted fisheries, coastal eutrophication, heavy metal accumulation, and rising dissolved CO2 in the surface waters. But does this unintended deterioration justify large-scale, purposeful Interference with ocean ecosystems? The oceans provide valuable ecosystem services for the maintenance of our planet and the sustenance of human society (1, 21), and the carbon cycle is intimately coupled with those of other elements, some of which play critical roles in climate regulation One can- not sequester additional carbon without changing coupled biogeochemical cycles. Models predict, for example, that sustained fertilization would likely result in deep ocean hypoxia or anoxia (22). This shift would the microbial community toward organisms that produce greenhouse gases such as methane and nitrous oxide, with much higher warming potentials than CO2 (23). Some models predict that Southern Ocean would change patterns of primary productivity globally by reducing the availability of N and P in the Equatorial Pacific (22). The uncertainties surrounding these cumulative, long-term, consequences of fertilization cannot be reduced through short term, small-scale experiments. To us, the known consequences and uncertainties of ocean fertilization already far outweigh hypothetical beneﬁts. Models predict that if all of the unused N and P in Southern Ocean surface waters were converted to organic carbon over the next l00 years(an unlikely extreme), 15% of the anthropogenic C02, could be hypothetically sequestered (22). Because deep ocean O0, reservoirs are eventually re-exposed to the atmosphere through global ocean circulation, this would not be a permanent solution. It is argued however that it would buy us time. Given both the certain and likely consequences of widespread ocean fertilization, which at some critical scale would not be reversible, we do not ﬁnd this justification compelling’ . We are not arguing against selective small-scale iron enrichment experiments designed to answer questions about how ocean ecosystems function. Such experiments have proven to be extremely valuable scientifically (10-13) and produce very transient effects. Our objections are to commercialized ocean fertilization—the scaled-up consequences of which could be very damaging to the global oceans. To put ocean fertilization as a carbon sequestration option into perspective, we need to remind ourselves why O0; is increasing in the atmosphere at such a rapid rate and to ask how sequestration could mitigate this rise. Two basic carbon cycles operate on Earth The ﬁrst cycle is driven by volcanic outgassing of O0; coupled to the metamorphic weathering of silicate rocks. This cycle operates on time scales of millions of years (24). The second cycle involves the biological reduction of C02 to organic matter and the subsequent oxidation of the organic matter by respiration. A tiny fraction of organic carbon escapes respiratory oxidation and is incorporated into the lithosphere, forming fossil fuels. This process transfers carbon from the fast, biologically driven cycle to the slow, tectonically controlled cycle. By burning fossil fuels, humans are bringing carbon from the slow cycle back into the atmosphere. The biological sinks—chieﬂy forests and phytoplankton—cannot adjust fast enough, and do not have the capacity to remove all this anthropogenic carbon from the atmosphere. For carbon sequestration to work as a climate mitigation strategy, O0; must be sequestered back into the slow carbon cycle. Ocean fertilization does not do so; nor does direct injection of C02 into mid-ocean waters, another proposed method for carbon sequestration Direct injection short-circuits the biological pump but it may trigger unknown effects on deep sea life and thus on biogeochemical processes (4). Given all of the risks and limitations, why has the idea of industrial scale ocean fertilization not been summarily dismissed? One answer lies in carbon trading (5). One need not fertilize entire ocean basins to sequester an amount of carbon that could yield commercial benefits on this anticipated market. If scientifically sound veriﬁcation criteria could be developed, relatively small-scale fertilizations could be very proﬁtable for individual entrepreneurs. True, no single application would cause sustained ecosystem damage. But if it is profitable for one, it would be proﬁtable for many, and the cumulative effects of many such implementations would result in large-scale consequences—a classic “tragedy of the commons” (25). One simple way to avert this potential tragedy is to remove the profit incentive for manipulation of the ocean commons. We suggest that ocean fertilization, in the open seas or territorial waters, should never become eligible.

### Link- Hydro energy

#### Hydraulics have direct and indirect impacts which inevitably lead to ecological consequences-we frame the impact on the ecological destruction due to anthropocentrism

Grecian et al 10 (W. JAMES GRECIAN1,\*, RICHARD INGER2, MARTIN J. ATTRILL1, STUART BEARHOP2, BRENDAN J. GODLEY2, MATTHEW J. WITT2 and STEPHEN C. VOTIER1 , Grecian Attrill, Votier are all part of the Marine Biology & Ecology Research Centre, Inger, Bearhop, Godley, and Witt are all part of the Peninsula Research Institute for Marine Renewable Energy (PRIMaRE) and Marine Institute, University of Plymouth, Drake Circus, Plymouth, Devon PL4 8AA, UK, 12 August 2010, Potential impacts of wave-powered marine renewable energy installations on marine birds, British Ornithologists Union, [Volume 152, Issue 4,](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ibi.2010.152.issue-4/issuetoc)pages 683–697)

It is harder to predict the indirect impacts that wave-powered MREIs may have on local habitats and prey species, but these could be of equal importance to direct impacts on marine birds, leading to population-level changes. Changes to oceanographic processes There is the potential for wave-powered MREIs to reduce foraging opportunities for birds through trophic changes resulting from altered oceanographic processes ([Frederiksen et al. 2007b](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1474-919X.2010.01048.x/full#b27)). Attenuators such as Pelamis may extract up to 23% of the incidental energy from a wave ([Palha et al. 2010](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1474-919X.2010.01048.x/full#b73)), although the efficiency of energy extraction will differ between devices and wave states. The area of ocean affected by the wave shadow produced by an array will also move relative to the prevailing wave and wind direction ([Millar et al. 2007](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1474-919X.2010.01048.x/full#b67)). A reduction in wave energy could impact transport processes ([Pelc & Fujita 2002](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1474-919X.2010.01048.x/full#b75)) and might be detrimental to spawning or nursery sites ([Gill 2005](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1474-919X.2010.01048.x/full#b32)). Conversely, reducing the ability of currents to move sediment would lead to the accumulation of organic matter, increasing biodiversity by providing habitat for deposit and suspension feeders such as polychaetes ([Fabi et al. 2002](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1474-919X.2010.01048.x/full#b21)). In coastal sites there is also the potential for a scale-dependent reduction in the wave energy that reaches the shore, which could lead to changes in sedimentation and shoreline processes ([Millar et al. 2007](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1474-919X.2010.01048.x/full#b67)). The potential bottom-up effects of these impacts and their scale are unknown, but if predicted changes to the micro-scale tidal climate within an MREI were to have a detrimental impact on spawning and larval recruitment in the surrounding area ([Gill 2005](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1474-919X.2010.01048.x/full#b32)), the likely outcome would be a reduction in food availability for higher trophic level animals such as birds. Further work is required to quantify both the wave shadow produced by large arrays of devices, and the environmental consequences. Changes in food availability Foraging opportunities for birds could be altered through detrimental changes to local-scale habitat around wave-powered MREIs, although there may also be beneficial effects through enhancement of small-scale hydrographic processes such as eddies. Novel structures placed in areas with little or no hard substrate will enable the colonization of sandy areas by hard bottom-dwelling species ([Bulleri et al. 2003](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1474-919X.2010.01048.x/full#b8)). Studies on the colonization of wind-powered MREIs show them to be dominated by Blue Mussels Mytilus trossulus and Acorn Barnacles Balanus improvisus, with altered fish communities having a higher abundance but lower species diversity ([Wilhelmssonet al. 2006](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1474-919X.2010.01048.x/full#b106)). Invasive species typically colonize more rapidly than indigenous species following disturbance ([Bulleri & Airoldi 2005](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1474-919X.2010.01048.x/full#b7)), which could impact marine birds if invasive species out-competed preferred prey species, but could also offer benefits if the monocultures were exploited (see [Positive Interactions](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1474-919X.2010.01048.x/full#ss16) below). The installation of tidal turbines in the Bay of Fundy has negatively affected migratory fish populations, with potential consequences for the marine animals reliant on this seasonal resource ([Dadswell & Rulifson 1994](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1474-919X.2010.01048.x/full#b11)). The redirection of fish migration routes away from areas with large arrays would have obvious deleterious effects for piscivorous bird species. An increase in fish mortality due to collision or entrapment would have a long-term negative effect, although there may be short-term benefits for scavenging species.

### Link- Oil

#### Offshore oil drilling is too risky-empirics prove to well despite what the affirmative may say about the safety-we can’t gamble the risk for the negative impact of the marine ecology

Hong and Yangie 09 (Mei Hong and Yin Yangie, Law and Politics school University of China (Hong), School of engineering and arts Qindao Technical College, February 27 2009, Study on Marine Spills and their ecological damage J. Ocean University China)

The sources of marine oil spills are mainly from accidents oil marine oil tankers or freighters, marine oil-drilling platforms, marine oil pipelines, marine oilfields. terrestrial pollution, oil-bearing atmosphere. and offshore oil production equipment. It is concluded upon analysis that there are two main reasons for marine oil spills: (I) The motive for huge economic beneﬁts of oil industry owners and oil shipping agents far surpasses their sense of ecological risks. (ll) Marine ecological safety has not become the main concern of national security. Oil spills are disasters because humans spare no efforts to get economic beneﬁts from oil. The present paper draws another conclusion that marine ecological damage caused by oil spills can be roughly divided into two categories: damage to marine resource value (direct value) and damage to marine ecosystem service value (indirect value). Marine oil spills cause damage to marine biological. fishery, seawater, tourism and mineral resources to various extents, which contributes to the lower quality and value of marine resources. On May ll, 2006, Solar I, an oil tanker chartered by Petron Corp., the largest oil reﬁnery in the Philippines, sank near Guimaras Island, the Philippines (0CHA-Geneva, 2006). There was about 200000 liters (53000 gallons) of bunker oil in the initial spill. The tanker was sunk in deep water. Making recovery unlikely with an additional 1.8 million liters (475000 gallons) of bunker fuel on board. Roughly 320km (200 miles) of coast line was covered in thick sludge. Miles of coral reel‘ were destroyed and I000 hectares (2470 acres) of marine re~ serve badly damaged. Many mangrove trees and coral reef died and about 25000 people were already affected or displaced during the ﬁrst few days. 'l11is oil spill was. Undoubtedly. a disaster to the marine ecosystem. However, we must be aware that it was just one case. Let us look back on some serious marine oil spills in history: the oil tanker Torrey Canyon spilled oil; the oil tanker Amoco Cadiz caused leakage (Black-tides, 2008) ; the drilling platform Well lxtoc I Well exploded after catching ﬁre and caused the oil well's blowout: (Office of Response and Restoration, 2007) Exxon Valdez grounded and spilled oil; the oil tanker Prestige wrecked and caused leakage; the oil tanker Tasman Sea spilled oil; BP shutdown the Prudhoe Bay oil ﬁeld due to a spill from an oil transit line (Blanca cl aI., 2006). It is necessary for us to find out the reasons of oil spills that have frequently occurred for half a century. Actually accidents of marine oil tankers or freighters, marine oil-drilling platforms, marine oil pipelines, marine oilfields, fuel leakages, vessels sinking, marine oil exploration and exploitation, operations at ports or quays and operations of offshore and coastal installations can all cause serious damage to the marine ecosystem and have become the main reasons for threatening marine ecological safety (Baker ct aI., 1993). It is essential to identify the sources of marine oil spills, make a profound analysis of the basic reasons, and illustrate the marine ecological damage caused by oil spills (Si, 2002).

### Link – Offshore Wind

#### Offshore Wind triggers a host of environmental crises and the science isn’t advanced enough to know its full consequences

Bergström et al 12

(Lena, Lena Kautsky, Torleif Malm, Hans Ohlsson, Magnus Wahlberg, Rutger Rosenberg & Nastassja Åstrand Capetillo “Effects of wind power on marine life – a summary”, Vindval, 3-5)

Offshore wind power There are mainly two types of foundation structures used in Sweden today: gravity-based foundations and monopole foundations. These are also the most commercially viable. Offshore wind farm projects affect the environment in different ways during installation, operation and decommissioning. The installation stage is assessed to have the largest Impact on the environment, since high noise levels and ailment dispersal can affect marine organisms. A wind farm In operation can cause barrier effects as well as changes in the natural environment. The decommissioning phase can again enhance noise levels and lead to sediment dispersal in the park and its adjacent area. Effects on marine organisms and communities Since marine environmental conditions vary between different locations as well as over time, it is difficult to make universal assessments of the effects of offshore wind power. This increases the importance of well-designed pilot studies and monitoring programs of the local environment. Also, location-specific surveys minimize the risk that costly measures are used when they are not needed. In general, installation and decommissioning of offshore wind farms should be planned so that sensitive reproductive periods for marine species are avoided. Particular consideration might also be needed for constructions in important growth and spawning areas for fish and marine mammals, or specific environments, such as offshore banks with high nature values. Acoustic disturbances during the installation As monopile foundations are being driven into the sea floor, a lot of noise is generated that spreads in the water. Cod and herring can potentially perceive noise from pile driving at a distance of 80 kilometers, experiencing physical damage and death at just a few meters from the place of installation. For all types of work involving noise, flight reactions in fish are expected within a distance of about one kilometre from the source. The greatest risk of significant harm to fish populations exists if the installation overlaps with important recruitment areas for threatened or weak populations. Among the marine mammals, porpoises have proved to get both impaired hearing and behavioral disturbances from noise associated with pile driving. There are no studies indicating any long-term negative effects on any of the Swedish seal species. It is not possible to draw any general conclusions of the effects on in- vertebrates from pile driving noise, since the group is too large and diverse. The few studies that exist, however, show that oysters are relatively sensitive, whilst mussels are not affected at all. The effects of high noise levels can be reduced by, for example, successively increasing the power and thus the noise at piling, so that larger animals such as fish, seal and porpoises are intimidated at an early stage and leave the construction area well before high noise levels are reached. Sediment dispersal Dredging work during the construction of gravity-based foundations, and Wiring between the turbines and land, can cause sediment from the bottom to whirl up and disperse in the water mass. The amount of sediment dispersed depends on the type of sediment, water currents and which dredging method is being used. Increased concentrations of sediment in the water affect mainly fish fry and larval stages negatively. Invertebrates are often adapted to re-suspension of sediment, since it naturally occurs in their environment. The sediment dispersal at the construction of a wind farm is often confined to a short period. The effects are also relatively small due to the fact that the bottom sediment is usually coarse-grained. The overall assessment rs therefore that sediment dispersal is a limited problem for most animal and plant communities. Introduction of a new habitat The foundations of wind turbines can function as artificial reefs and attract many fish species, particularly around gravity-based foundations that have a structurally complex erosion protection. At first there is often a redistribution of fish from nearby areas to the wind power foundations, but over time an actual increased fish production within the park is possible, as long as the park is large enough and the fishing pressure is low. The structure of the erosion protection can mean local positive effects for crustaceans such as lobster and crab, by functioning as shelter as well as increasing their foraging area. One example of specie that seems to increase locally around foundation structures in the Kattegat and Skagerrak and the Baltic Proper is the blue mussel. Which species that will dominate depends on the salinity in the area. There are no studies showing that the foundation structures may facilitate the distribution of new species to Swedish marine areas. The total amount of hard bottom surface formed by the foundations and their structures is relatively small.

### Link- Shipping Transport

#### Shipping transport has the inherent risk of leakage and lack of traffic management-The affirmative is hubristic thinking that they can dismiss these causes-prefer the affirmative alternative.

Hong and Yangie 09 (Mei Hong and Yin Yangie, Law and Politics school University of China (Hong), School of engineering and arts Qindao Technical College, February 27 2009, Study on Marine Spills and their ecological damage J. Ocean University China)

The new industrial era beginning alter World War ll began to change the world into an oil-centered energy structure. The great demand for economic development heated up the tide of oil exploration and exploitation, while inevitably the oil exploitation and transportation were accompanied by oil spills. In particular marine oil spills have become a category of man-made disasters that seriously affect humans‘ ecological safety Economic beneﬁts and public safety and destroy the marine ecosystem. The main sources of marine oil spills are as follows: Firstly, oil leakage of vessels is one of the main sources of marine oil spills, which includes oil leakage in normal shipping and vessel accidents. The imbalance in global oil storage leads to the classiﬁcation of oil importing and exporting countries. With the development of the global economy, in order to guarantee the safety of oil supply, most countries have begun to develop marine oil transportation. Therefore, crude oil via marine transport has increased signiﬁcantly. The oil tankers have become bigger and have greater tonnage. In reality the shipping industry can not evade various risks at sea. Besides, there exist various reasons for oil spill such as aging ships, bad technology, centralized shipping routes. the lack of advanced traffic management system in the ports; In addition, oil tankers and other ships frequently encounter accidents such as collisions, grounding, strikes on rocks and marine disasters. Oil spills pollute the marine environment and destroy the marine ecosystem seriously.

### Link- Nuclear power

#### Floating nuclear power plants plague the marine ecology with air and water pollution leading to ecologic deterioration-the plan is too risky towards the environment and only serves the anthropogenic mindset.

Glaser 68 (Peter E. Glaser, Peter E. Glaser, a noted pioneer in the study of solar energy. Born in Czechoslovakia, Glaser came to the United States in 1948 and earned an M.S. and a Ph.D. in mechanical engineering at Columbia University, 22 November 1968, Power from the sun: its future, Volume 162, Number 3856)

In Fig. 2 the estimated energy consumption for the United States is projected to the year 2200. By that date, the projection indicates, approximately 30 percent of the total power requirements will have to be met by energy sources other than those available today (3). This requirement for resources represents a deﬁnite energy deﬁciency, which within that time span may well become worldwide. Evolutionary pressures and technological progress will tend to hasten the use of nuclear power. and this will reduce our dependence on fossil-fuel reserves for a time. Should present obstacles in the development of fusion-generated power be removed, our energy requirements may, it appears be met. However, the control of fusion is still the physicist's dream. It is expected that new physical principles will have to be discovered and huge plants built before useful power from this source can become available to us. To meet the projected power demands, several major obstacles will have to be overcome, and the disadvantages of power-generating processes we are now considering will have to be reduced or offset. Control of the environmental deterioration that results from our efforts to meet the increasing demand for power from available energy sources will be increasingly more difficult and more costly. Air pollution and water pollution already plague us; in addition, thermal pollution from nuclear power plants could threaten rivers and lakes in heavily populated areas. The need to control this source of pollution has been recognized, and the use of cooling towers may partially solve this problem. But substantial costs would be involved; utility companies may have to spend $2 billion for cooling towers and related equipment in the next I3 years, in addition to the basic $19-billion in- vestment they expect to make in nuclear power plants (4). (Estimates for U.S. investment in electric-power-generating plants of all types over the next 20 years range up to $100 billion. (When the investments for environmental control are extrapolated over 30 to 50 years, we can see that our major concern will be alternative approaches, to reduce the cost of controlling undesirable effects on our environment.

#### **Nuclear weapons, nuclear power, and ecology all have an interconnection-for every impact on one there is a correlation, ther affirmative plan has unknown consequences due to the lack of thinking they put into these relationships.**

Hannigan 14 (John Hannigan, John H. Hannigan, Ph.D. is the Deputy Director of the Merrill Palmer Skillman Institute, 2014, Environmental Sociology Third Edition)

After the scale of destruction wreaked by the dropping of atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan became evident, many scientists involved in the Manhattan Project turned in horror away from the further development of nuclear weapons. Some of them founded the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, a magazine dedicated to peace and security. In 1947 the Bulletin set up the ‘Doomsday Clock’ as a symbolic warning of the dangers of atomic weapons of war. The Clock was intended to evoke both the image of apocalypse (midnight) and the contemporary idea of nuclear explosion (countdown to zero) Initially, the Bulletin set the clock at seven minutes to midnight, with midnight representing the end of the world. In 1953, after the test of the hydrogen bomb, the clock moved dangerously close to its endpoint, being adjusted at two minutes to midnight. ‘Only a few more swings of the pendulum’, Bulletin editors warned, ‘and, from Moscow to Chicago, atomic explosions will strike midnight for Western civilization’. When the Cold War finally wound down in 1991, the setting was moved backed to 17 minutes to midnight. AS of August 2013, the hands are situated at five minutes to midnight. The editors explain, ‘The challenges to rid the world of nuclear weapons, harness nuclear power, and meet the nearly inexorable climate disruption from global warming are complex and interconnected’ (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, September, 1953, cited in Willis 2013) Limits of growth As the 1970s unfolded, we were reminded the planet remained in a state of grave anger, but for an entirely different reason. This impending crisis is outlined by four members (Dennis Meadows, Donella ‘Dana’ Meadows, Jorgen Randers, William Behrens) of Jay Forrester’s systems dynamics group at the Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). The Club of Rome, a private international thick tank founded in 1968 by Italian industrialist Aurelio Peccei commissioned the project and arranged funding through the Volkswagen Foundation. Harper (2008: 2010) claims that the Limits of Growth (LG) project, in combination with neo-Marxian political economy, constitutes ‘the soil from which environmental sociology grew, and continues to inform its dominant modes of theorizing and empirical analysis’. Buell (2003: 144) attributes the tremendous importance of the book to the fact that it was the first to depict the global environmental threat as a ‘social’ crisis resulting from human economic and population growth and requiring nothing less than fundamental societal change.

### Link- GMOs

#### Genetically Modified Organisms create huge disruption in the environment-impacts like invasion, mutated reproduction, and could possibly become a biohazard-reject aff plan to attain ecocentric attitudes.

Covello and Merkhofer 93 (Vincent T. Covello and Miley W. Merkhofer, Vincent T. Covello is a nationally and internationally recognized expert in risk communications: the art and science of communicating effectively in high concern/ low trust situations. He is currently serving as Director of the Center for Risk Communication in New York City, and has a PhD, Miley W. (Lee) Merkhofer is a author and practitioner in the field of [decision analysis](http://www.prioritysystem.com/glossary1a.html#decisionanalysis). His specialty is [project portfolio management](http://www.prioritysystem.com/glossary2.html#ppm) (PPM). 1993, Risk Assessment Methods: Approaches for Assessing Health and Environmental Risks)

Genetic engineering is the technology used to alter the genetic material of living cells, thereby enabling changes to be made to the inherited characteristics of plants, animals, and microorganisms. The methods of genetic engineering range from traditional techniques (such as natural mating methods for selective breeding) to the advanced recombinant DNA techniques, wherein genetic material is manipulated directly. The ability to produce organic materials with new characteristics offers diverse application opportunities including the production of pharmaceutical products (e.g., human insulin, growth hormones, antibodies, and vaccines), food processing (e.g., fermentation, development of edible microorganisms), and agriculture (e.g., plant breeding). However, genetic engineering may pose serious risks; for example, a new organism may cause harm, or an introduced gene may be transferred to other organisms, causing harms. Initial concerns about genetic engineering focused on the safety and security of the laboratories in which it is conducted. More recently, attention has shifted to the special risks associated with genetically engineered microorganisms designed for use in the environment. Potential environmental uses of genetically engineered organisms include biological pesticides, mineral leaching and recovery, enhanced oil recovery, and pollution control. To fully understand the commercial potential of such products, the organisms must be tested in the field. Field tests inevitably result in the use of large volumes of microorganisms and decreased control. Nonindigenous organisms introduced into an ecosystem may displace or disrupt existing biological communities. They may harm individuals of an indigenous species or whole populations by causing infectious disease. Genetic material may be transferred from the introduced organisms to indigenous organisms, with unanticipated effects. For instance, if drug resistance were to be transferred to clinically important bacteria, the range of antibiotics available for treating infections could be reduced. A transferred characteristic may create a selective advantage for the modified microbe, allowing it to increase its population and substantially alter the microbial ecosystem. Finally, introduced organisms will consume and alter chemicals encountered in the environment. The altered forms, or breakdown products, are called metabolites. The metabolites produced by the organisms may themselves be toxic and persistent in the environment. For example, a potential concern regarding microorganisms intended to biodegrade toxic chemicals is the buildup of intermediary metabolites that are more toxic, more mobile, and/or more resistant than the original chemicals (Strauss, 1991).2

### Critical Pedagogy Link

#### Critical pedagogy papers over anthropocentric activity that abuses the more-than human and precludes aff solvency.

Bell and Russell ‘00

[Anne C. , York Universi- ty and Constance L., University of Toronto, “Beyond Human, Beyond Words: Anthropocentrism, Critical Pedagogy, and the Poststructuralist Turn,” [http://www.csse-scee.ca/CJE/Articles/FullText/CJE25-3/CJE25-3-bell.pdf 10/24/11](http://www.csse-scee.ca/CJE/Articles/FullText/CJE25-3/CJE25-3-bell.pdf%2010/24/11)]

For this reason, the various movements against oppression need to be aware of and supportive of each other. In critical pedagogy, however, the exploration of questions of race, gender, class, and sexuality has proceeded so far with little acknowledgement of the systemic links between human oppressions and the domination of nature. The more-than-human world and human relationships to it have been ignored, as if the suffering and exploitation of other beings and the global ecological crisis were somehow irrelevant. Despite the call for attention to voices historically absent from traditional canons and narratives (Sadovnik, 1995, p. 316), nonhuman beings are shrouded in silence. This silence characterizes even the work of writers who call for a rethinking of all culturally positioned essentialisms. Like other educators influenced by poststructuralism, we agree that there is a need to scrutinize the language we use, the meanings we deploy, and the epistemological frameworks of past eras (Luke & Luke, 1995, p. 378). To treat social categories as stable and unchanging is to reproduce the prevailing relations of power (Britzman et al., 1991, p. 89). What would it mean, then, for critical pedagogy to extend this investigation and critique to include taken-for-granted understandings of "human," "animal," and "nature"? This question is difficult to raise precisely because these understandings are taken for granted. The anthropocentric bias in critical pedagogy manifests itself in silence and in the asides of texts. Since it is not a topic of discussion, it can be difficult to situate a critique of it. Following feminist analyses, we find that examples of anthropocentrism, like examples of gender symbolization, occur "in those places where speakers reveal the assumptions they think they do not need to defend, beliefs they expect to share with their audiences" (Harding, 1986, p. 112). Take, for example, Freire's (1990) statements about the differences between "Man" and animals. To set up his discussion of praxis and the importance of "naming" the world, he outlines what he assumes to be shared, commonsensical beliefs about humans and other animals. He defines the boundaries of human membership according to a sharp, hierarchical dichotomy that establishes human superiority. Humans alone, he reminds us, are aware and self-conscious beings who can act to fulfill the objectives they set for themselves. Humans alone are able to infuse the world with their creative presence, to overcome situations that limit them, and thus to demonstrate a "decisive attitude towards the world" (p. 90). Freire (1990, pp. 87–91) represents other animals in terms of their lack of such traits. They are doomed to passively accept the given, their lives “totally determined” because their decisions belong not to themselves but to their species. Thus whereas humans inhabit a “world” which they create and transform and from which they can separate themselves, for animals there is only habitat, a mere physical space to which they are “organically bound.” To accept Freire’s assumptions is to believe that humans are animals only in a nominal sense. We are different not in degree but in kind, and though we might recognize that other animals have distinct qualities, we as humans are somehow more unique. We have the edge over other creatures because we are able to rise above monotonous, species-determined biological existence. Change in the service of human freedom is seen to be our primary agenda. Humans are thus cast as active agents whose very essence is to transform the world – as if somehow acceptance, appreciation, wonder, and reverence were beyond the pale. This discursive frame of reference is characteristic of critical pedagogy. The human/animal opposition upon which it rests is taken for granted, its cultural and historical specificity not acknowledged. And therein lies the problem. Like other social constructions, this one derives its persuasiveness from its “seeming facticity and from the deep investments individuals and communities have in setting themselves off from others” (Britzman et al., 1991, p. 91). This becomes the normal way of seeing the world, and like other discourses of normalcy, it limits possibilities of taking up and con- fronting inequities (see Britzman, 1995). The primacy of the human enterprise is simply not questioned. Precisely how an anthropocentric pedagogy might exacerbate the environmental crisis has not received much consideration in the literature of critical pedagogy, especially in North America. Although there may be passing reference to planetary destruction, there is seldom mention of the relationship between education and the domination of nature, let alone any sustained exploration of the links between the domination of nature and other social injustices. Concerns about the nonhuman are relegated to environmental education. And since environmental education, in turn, remains peripheral to the core curriculum (A. Gough, 1997; Russell, Bell, & Fawcett, 2000), anthropocentrism passes unchallenged.1

### Race Links

#### **The current mindset of the human mind is based off anthropocentrism, and additionally has an intrinsic link to racism.**

Snauwaert 96 (Dale T. Snauwaert, Ph.D. is Professor of Philosophy of Education and Director of the Center for Nonviolence and Democratic Education in the Judith Herb College of Education at The University of Toledo. He is the Founding Editor of In Factis Pax: Online Journal of Peace Education and Social Justice. 1996, The Relevance of the Anthropocentric-Ecocentric Debate, Philosophy of Education)

This argument commits what Warwick Fox refers to as “the anthropocentric fallacy,” a version of the fallacy of equivocation. A fallacy of this kind conflates the trivial and substantive senses of a concept. In this case, what is conflated is the inescapable and trivial fact that environmental ethics is derived from a human perspective with the substantive content of the ethic. In the trivial sense, all varieties of environmental ethics are equally anthropocentric because they are inescapably conceived by human beings. However, in the substantive sense the wide variety of human conceptions of responsibility pertaining to the environment are extremely divergent, some anthropocentric others ecocentric. To say that intrinsic value theory is anthropocentric because it is inescapably conceived by a human being is equivalent to saying that the advocacy by a white male of affirmative action and equal opportunity for African-American women is sexist and racist because it is advocated by such a male. This is a trivial argument in the same sense that it conflates what is obvious with what is substantive. It is the substance of the argument made by ecophilosophers for an nonanthropocentric, ecocentric ethic that is the issue, not the trivial fact that ecophilosophers are human beings. Appeal to the trivial sense of the argument is insufficient grounds for refuting its substance. It is unfounded to assert that human beings are incapable of adopting an ecocentric perspective simply because they are human.

## **Impact**

### **Framing**

#### **This is a framing issue. Their utilitarian logic of action for human pleasure—economic rationality, maximization of human lives saved, prevention of human extinction—is a manifestation of anthropocentric thought that devalues the non-human.**

O’Neill ’97 [Onora, professor of philosophy at Newnham College. “Environmental Values, Anthropocentrism, and Speciesism.” *Environmental Values* 6, no.2, (1997): 127-142.]

A common criticism of anthropocentrist positions in ethics is that they all incorporate what has come to be called speciesism. The term speciesism, which was coined by analogue with terms such as racism or chauvinism, is usually used as a label for unjustified preference for the human species. The problem with any form of speciesism, critics complain, is that it accords humans moral standing but unjustifiably accords animals of other species no, or only lesser, standing. On some views speciesism is also unjustifiable in its denial of moral standing to other aspects of the environment, ranging from plants and rivers to abstract entities such as species, habitats and ecosystems, bio-diversity and the ozone layer. Speciesism, as defined, is self-evidently to be condemned, since it builds on something that cannot be justified. Unfortunately the term speciesism is also often used (derogatorily) for any preference for the human species, regardless of whether the preference is justified or not. This dual usage makes it easy to beg questions. In order to avoid begging questions I shall use the term speciesism strictly for unjustified views about the moral standing of certain species, and leave the question whether any preferences can be justified open for discussion. However, I shall use the terms anti-speciesist and specieisist descriptively to refer to those who do and do not accord non-human animals (full) moral standing. Speciesists in this merely descriptive sense would be guilty of speciesism only if the preference they accord humans cannot be justified. The view that anthropocentric positions in ethics are invariably committed to speciesism, so unjustifiably blind to the claims of non-humans, is, I believe, unconvincing. Anthropocentrism views ethics as created by or dependent on human action; speciesism builds a preference for human beings into substantive ethical view. Many anthropocentric positions have benign implications for environmental issues, and specifically for the lives of non-human animals. To show that it might seem reasonable to turn first to that supposedly least speciesist of anthropocentric positions, utilitarianism. Utilitarianism is anthropocentric in the straightforward and indispensable sense that it takes it that ethical argument is addressed to human agents, and that only humans can take up (or flout) utilitarian prescriptions. However, utilitarians claim to repudiate (human) speciesism because they offer reasons for according moral standing to all sentient animals. As Bentham put it, the way to determine moral standing is to ask not ‘Can they reason? Or can they talk? But can they suffer?’ By taking sentience rather than the ability to reason as the criterion of moral standing, utilitarians can show the ethical importance of human welfare; some of them even aim or claim to justify a conception of animal liberation. Still, it is worth remembering that utilitarianism needs only a little twist to reach conclusions which anti-speciesists do not welcome. John Stuart Mill agreed with Bentham that happiness was the measured of value but thought that it came in various kinds and that the higher kinds were restricted to humans. He concluded that it was better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied. Utilitarian reasoning about required trade-offs between different types of pleasure may demand that human happiness (of the higher sort) be pursued at the cost of large amounts of porcine misery. The readiness with which utilitarian thinking can return to prescriptions which favour humans is not unimportant: in a world in which xenotransplantation from pigs to humans may be possible, Millian and Benthamite forms of utilitarianism will perhaps reach quite different conclusions about permissible action. Even if this difficulty were set aside, there are other reasons why utilitarian thinking cannot provide a comprehensive environmental ethics. Utilitarianism relies on a subjective conception of value which allows it to take account of non-human pleasure and pain, but equally prevents it from valuing either particular non-sentient beings or dispersed and abstract features of the environment: anything that is sentient cannot suffer or enjoy, so is denied moral standing. Oak trees, bacteria and Mount Everest, species and habitats, ecosystems and biodiversity, the ozone layer and CO2 levels are not sentient organisms, so utilitarians will conclude that they can have at most derivative value. They may value bacteria and habitats as constituting or providing the means of life for individual sentient animals; they may value bio-diversity as increasing the likelihood of future survival or pleasure for sentient animals: but they will not value these aspects of the environment except as a means to pleasure or happiness in the lives of sentient beings. A second, equally central feature of utilitarianism also suggests that, far from being the most environmentally benign of anthropocentric positions, it is inevitably highly selective in its concern for the environment. Utilitarian thinking, like other forms of consequentialism, insists that trading-off results is not merely permitted but required. Maximizing happiness or welfare or pleasure can be achieved only by trading-off some outcomes to achieve others. There is no way in which to pursue the greatest happiness of the greatest number without pursuing happiness that will be enjoyed in some lives at the expense of suffering that is to be borne in other lives. Some of the outcomes that yield a lot of happiness (or welfare, or pleasure) in some lives—for example, economic growth and exclusive patterns of consumption—have high environmental costs which are not, or fully, registered as suffering experienced in any sentient lives. Equally environmental damage that affects no sentient beings (e.g. destruction of arctic or desert wilderness with no or little destruction of sentient life) will not count as a cost or harm. More generally, maximizing approaches that rely on a subjective measure of value will not merely permit but require pleasurable environmental damage whose costs escape their calculus. These worries might perhaps be assuaged to a limited degree by working out how environmental gain or damage could be more fully or better represented in utilitarian and cognate calculations. But better representation of environmental gain or damage in utilitarian and kindred reasoning is still only representation of their effects on sentient lives: a subjective measure of value is still assumed. There is no guarantee that such measures of values will register all environmental gain or damage, and no guarantee that widely shared or trivial short-term pleasures that damage will not outweigh the pains caused by that damage. The destruction of wilderness or environmentally sensitive areas will be a matter for concern only insofar as it is not outweighed by the pleasure of destroying them; the suffering caused by destruction of fragile habitats with few but rare sentient inhabitants might be outweighed, for example, by the pleasures of tourism or gold-mining.

### Hierarchies

#### Anthropocentrism is the root cause of hierarchies

Kochi, 9 [Tarik, Sussex law school, “Species war: Law, Violence and Animals,” Law Culture and Humanities Oct 5.3]

This reflection need not be seen as carried out by every individual on a daily basis but rather as that which is drawn upon from time to time within public life as humans inter-subjectively coordinate their actions in accordance with particular enunciated ends and plan for the future. 21 In this respect, the violence and killing of species war is not simply a question of survival or bare life, instead, it is bound up with a consideration of the good. For most modern humans in the West the “good life” involves the daily killing of animals for dietary need and for pleasure. At the heart of the question of species war, and all war for that matter, resides a question about the legitimacy of violence linked to a philosophy of value. 22 The question of war-law sits within a wider history of decision making about the relative values of different forms of life. “Legitimate” violence is under-laid by cultural, religious, moral, political and philosophical conceptions about the relative values of forms of life. Playing out through history are distinctions and hierarchies of life-value that are extensions of the original human-animal distinction. Distinctions that can be thought to follow from the human-animal distinction are those, for example, drawn between: Hellenes and barbarians; Europeans and Orientals; whites and blacks; the “civilized” and the “uncivilized”; Nazis and Jews; Israeli’s and Arabs; colonizers and the colonized. Historically these practices and regimes of violence have been culturally, politically and legally normal-ized in a manner that replicates the normalization of the violence carried out against non-human animals. Unpacking, criticizing and challenging the forms of violence, which in different historical moments appear as “normal,” is one of the ongoing tasks of any critic who is concerned with the question of what war does to law and of what law does to war? The critic of war is thus a critic of war’s norm-alization.

### Ecological Destruction

#### **Anthropocentrism locks into a self-destructive cycle that ensures oppression and violence while inevitably leading to extinction.**

Dhillon’9 [Simi, writer, environmental and social justice activist. October 11, 2009. iBizBook. “Capitalistic Anthropocentrism: Leading Cause of Biodiversity Loss?” http://www.ibizbook.com/live/blogs/89-sim-dhillon/capitalistic-anthropocentrism-leading-cause-of-biodiversity-loss]

An anthropocentric (“human-centered”) view of nature, arguably a result of a capitalistic ideology (or vice versa), refers to the relationship between humans and animals, particularly a relationship in which animals and plants are valuable only to the extent to which they can be used and exploited by humans for humans in a capitalist system. This view sees nature as an instrument, rather than having any intrinsic value. The anthropocentric view of nature would suggest not only that nature is distinct from (and an instrument for) humans, but also that humans are individually-defined, autonomous creatures that selfishly pursue only their own needs and wants. Therefore, the suggestion is that humans too are distinct from and instrumentally used by other humans. In lieu of this idea, during the last century, erosion of biodiversity and species extinction has been increasingly observed due to human activities, in particular, destruction of plant and animal habitats. Almost all scientists acknowledge that the rate of species loss is greater now than at any time in human history, with extinctions occurring at rates hundreds of times higher than background extinction rates, as an estimated one of eight known plant species and a potential 140,000 species per year are threatened with extinction (Pimm, et al). Elevated rates of extinction are being driven by anthropocentric, capitalistic human consumption of organic resources, deforestation to clear land for housing development and agricultural and commercial use, and oil pollution representative of material waste; consequently, a move toward an eco-centric view of life other than human should be a human priority. Oppositions to this opinion may include those of “big business” companies that may or may not provide funds for environmental protection agencies, such as the Tesco Corporation (one of the United Kingdom’s largest food suppliers), which supports a biodiversity project called “Wildlife Choice” that supposedly tests techniques for increasing biodiversity on farms (Tesco Corporate). However, it appears upon review of the report summaries of the Tesco Corporation that their main purpose is to supply farmers with the diversity needed to increase their profit margins—a capitalistic incentive. Perhaps even more anthropocentric is the view of the Aachen Foundation, Germany’s private, politically independent organization committed to ‘Factor X’ resource productivity, which states, “If we want to maintain—and in many places improve—human well-being, society will have to learn to live on fewer resources…” (Aachen Foundation). The extent to which this statement is completely lacking any concern for non-human species is readily obvious. Although many organizations similar to the Tesco Corporation’s “Wildlife Choice” and the Aachen Foundation are in existence, and although they appear to be working out of concern for the environment, they only do so to the extent that their helping the environment will increase corporate productivity, maintain human standards of living, and reinforce Bourgeois ideology. By translating its economic power across all societal institutions, including environmental policy, the Bourgeoisie ensures that their economic interests dominate and that all institutions help to reproduce their (the Bourgeoisie’s) hegemony. The issue of over-consumption of Earth’s resources, a contributing factor to biodiversity loss, can therefore be attributed to the Bourgeois, anthropocentric obsession with materialistic capitalism. Social authorities control the means of production, which is, for the most part, environmentally based and has tragic, devastating effects on species’ habitats, food sources, and even health. Is it really incomprehensible to humans that the earth’s resources are limited and shared between and among all life?While most of the species that are becoming extinct are not food species, their biomass is converted into human food when their habitat is transformed into pasture, cropland, and orchards—all used for the supply of human tastes. It is estimated that more than 40% of the Earth's biomass is contained within only the few species that represent humans, our livestock, and crops. Because an ecosystem decreases in stability as its species are made extinct, these studies warn that the global ecosystem is destined for collapse if it is further reduced in complexity (Ehrlich, et al). The destruction of certain and all biomes for industrial and commercial use is resulting in the loss of homes and food for a number of different species—from jackrabbits in the desert to tropical birds in the rainforest. Not only does the market economy directly harm certain species by eradicating any trace of naturalness in the environment, but it also has indirect effects in that a cleared grassland on which a factory for the production of human goods is built results in the forced migration of gazelles from the habitat, thereby influencing the predator-prey relationship between lions and gazelles, forcing the predators to starve. Another effect of capitalism on predator-prey relationships can be seen in Uganda’s Lake Kioga, into which non-native fish were introduced as commercial entities, which ultimately dominated the presence of the native fish, and altered the feeding patterns and the predatory relationships of the aquatic life (FAO). The annihilation of habitats stretches beyond grasslands and lakes to tropical rainforests, in which the land is cleared both for agricultural and logging purposes.The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO 1997) has estimated the annual rates of deforestation in developing countries at 15.5 million hectares for the period between 1980 and 1990 and 13.7 million hectares for that between 1990 and 1995. The total forest area lost during the 15-year period is approximately 200 million hectares. In 1997 and 1998, there were serious losses in forest cover from the forest fires in Southeast Asia. The widespread fires were related to new commercial agricultural projects, land clearing for tree and agricultural plantations, dry residues left in the forest after logging, and slash-and-burn agriculture (CIDA). The human exploitation of animals’ homes for economic use is unjustifiable. The flora and fauna of these tropic regions face the greatest risks of extinction, yet their natural habitats are being consumed for the purposes of agriculture and industrial development for the maintenance of human existence, namely Bourgeois, as members of the human laboring classes are exploited to exploit the environment—but what about the existence of non-human species? Why does there exist such a lack of concern for the millions of species that share the same resources and environment that we do? Is it just to exploit those species that are unable to defend themselves against the human masses, let alone those policies that dictate even the lives of under-represented humans? The local extinctions among a wide range of terrestrial and freshwater taxa from Singapore in relation to habitat loss exceeding 95% over 183 years can be assessed through the substantial rates of documented and inferred extinctions that have been found, with the greatest proportion of extinct taxa (34−87%) in butterflies, fish, birds and mammals. Although observed extinctions are generally fewer, inferred losses are often much higher, for example in vascular plants, phasmids, decapods, amphibians and reptiles (5−80%). Forest reserves comprising only 0.25% of Singapore's area now harbor over 50% of the residual native biodiversity. Extrapolations of the observed and inferred local extinction data imply that the current unprecedented rate of habitat destruction in Southeast Asia will result in the loss of 13−42% of regional populations over the next century, at least half of which will represent global species extinctions (Brook, *et al*). Another example of the effects of deforestation on non-human organisms can be seen in tropical stream communities of Southeast Asia. The impacts of past riparian deforestation associated with slash-and-burn agriculture on stream habitats and communities in Borneo, East Malaysia, are obvious when compared to streams running through primary forests and those through secondary forests that had been deforested between 9 and 20 years previously. Distinctive differences can be found in depositional character of stream habitats in that secondary-forest reaches have finer substrates, more eroded banks, and larger areas of depositional habitat and cover than do primary-forest reaches. The resulting habitat alteration (i.e., sedimentation) has lowered the abundance and diversity of periphyton, aquatic insects, shrimps, crabs, and benthic fish. Slash-and-burn agriculture, which alters vegetation and soil conditions more intensively than logging, causes long-term degradation of stream communities (Iwata, et al). Not only does the economic benefit of farming affect the rate of biodiversity loss, but so, too, does global industrialization and urbanization. Perhaps the primary means of transporting goods internationally in the Bourgeois-run market economy is cargo ships. While ships today are more equipped than ever to handle “accidental” oil spills, the risks are far greater due to the ever increasing number of ships being used for commercial trading, an essential aspect of the market economy of capitalism. Oil spills resulting from tanker accidents can cause large-scale deterioration of communities in intertidal and shallow subtidal sedimentary systems. The fate, behavior, and environmental effects of spilled oil can vary depending upon the type and amount of material spilled. In general, lighter refined petroleum products such as diesel and gasoline are more likely to mix in the water column and are more toxic to marine life, whereas heavier crude or fuel oil, while of less immediate toxicity, can remain on the water surface or stranded on the shoreline for much longer. Oil from the Exxon Valdez and Gulf War oil spills, while weathering over time, has persisted along the shoreline for years after the spill. Studies of the Exxon Valdez oil spill have shown that the environmental damage caused by oil spills can be greater than was previously thought. It is now thought that the impacts to marine life can be evident at less than one part per billion petroleum hydrocarbons (NOAA). The effects ofoil on marine life are caused by either the physical nature of the oil (i.e., viscosity) or by its chemical components (i.e., toxicity).Marine life may also be affected by clean-up operations or indirectly through physical damage to the habitats in which plants and animals live. The main threat posed to living resources by the persistent residues of spilled oils is one of physical “smothering.” Oil deposition also causes a decrease in the availability of oxygen, as it seeps into sediment (UK Marine SACs Project). The animals and plants most at risk are those that could come into contact with a contaminated sea surface, such as marine mammals and reptiles, birds that feed by diving or form flocks on the sea, and marine life on shorelines. Impaired abilities of individual marine organisms to reproduce, grow, feed or perform other functions can be caused by prolonged exposure to a given concentration of oil. Sedentary animals in shallow waters such as oysters, mussels, and clams that routinely filter large volumes of seawater to extract food are especially likely to accumulate oil components (ITOPF). Ironically, although the concentrations of oil accumulated in the systems of such organisms may not be immediately toxic to the organisms, themselves, they may result in a decrease in profit margins for a number of fisheries in that the oil remaining in the organism can be tasted by humans, thus rendering the organism foul-tasting—an example of the market economy’s adverse effects not only on biodiversity, but also on itself.

#### **BioD destruction.**

Walsh 13 [Bryan Walsh, Senior writer for Time magazine covering environment and energy, was Tokyo Bureau chief, August 1, 2013, Shifting Baselines: Why the Environment Is Even Worse Off Than You Think, Time) <http://science.time.com/2013/08/01/shifting-baselines-why-the-environment-is-even-worse-off-than-you-think/>]

And it was nothing like it used to be. Coral cover in Glover’s Reef  [dropped](http://www.oceanus.org.mx/web/index2.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=7&Itemid=3" \t "_blank" \o "PDF) from 80% in 1971 to 13% in 1999. There’s been some recovery in the years since, thanks in part to the [establishment](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/27/science/earth/27reef.html?_r=0" \t "_blank" \o "NYT) of a large “no-take” protected area within the reef, and as a result Glover’s  is one of the healthiest coral ecosystems in the Caribbean. But that’s in many ways a reflection of how degraded the rest of the Caribbean—and coral reefs around the world—have become, thanks to pollution, coastal development, overfishing and climate change. Outside of parts of the South Pacific, too remote yet to be impacted by human activity, coral reefs are nothing like they used to be. The bewildering abundance, the sheer mass and variety of sealife that the first scuba divers would have encountered decades ago is long gone. We’re trying to protect a shadow of what once was—even though to me, floating among the coral of Glover’s Reef and straining for a view of that elusive hammerhead shark, it all seemed so perfect. It turns there’s a scientific term for this feeling: shifting baselines. The fisheries scientist Daniel Pauly coined it in 1995 to describe how overfishing has changed the ocean so rapidly over the past several decades that what we think of as normal and healthy—the baseline—has had to shift to keep up with reality. Our picture of the environment becomes skewed, as we forget what used to be and adjust unconsciously to a diminished present. Pauly explained the concept [in a 2010 TED talk](http://www.ted.com/talks/daniel_pauly_the_ocean_s_shifting_baseline.html" \t "_blank" \o "TED) filmed on a  expedition to the Galapagos organized by the oceanographer Sylvia Earle—another trip I was [lucky enough to be part of](http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2020806_2020805_2020796,00.html" \t "_blank" \o "Time): We transform the world, but we don’t remember it. We adjust our baseline to the new level,and we don’t recall what was there. If you generalize this, something like this happens. You have on the y axis some good thing: biodiversity, numbers of orca, the greenness of your country, the water supply. And over time it changes — it changes because people do things, or naturally. Every generation will use the images that they got at the beginning of their conscious lives as a standard and will extrapolate forward. And the difference then, they perceive as a loss. But they don’t perceive what happened before as a loss. You can have a succession of changes. At the end you want to sustain miserable leftovers. And that, to a large extent, is what we want to do now. We want to sustain things that are gone or things that are not the way they were. Ocean science is particularly vulnerable to this effect because we still know so little about the state of the deep now—and even less about the way it was decades or centuries ago. Reliable global fishing statistics[only go back](http://www.fao.org/docrep/015/i2389e/i2389e.pdf" \t "_blank" \o "FAO) to about mid-century, and it was only around the same time that scientists began to be able to explore the underwater oceans in depth. But underwater pictures and film from decades ago are rare, and there’s little hard, original baseline data—which is why that baseline shifts so easily. The best evidence of how the oceans have changed over that time period is found in the memories of the veteran scientists and divers who have actually seen the transition over the course of their lifetimes—people like Earle, who [has been diving and studying](http://mission-blue.org/" \t "_blank" \o "Blue) the oceans since the 1950s, and Jeremy Jackson, a marine ecologist at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography. Jackson has studied the coral reefs around Jamaica for decades, and over that time, he’s seen that ecosystem [destroyed](http://www.shiftingbaselines.org/team/" \t "_blank" \o "Jackson) by development and pollution. But someone diving today in Jamaican waters—and thousands of people do every year—would have no idea what they were missing, just as I can’t imagine what a pristine Glover’s Reef might have looked like decades ago. The present—diminished as it may be—is my baseline.

### VTL

#### Attempting to act on impending environmental disasters kills value to life and guarantees nuclear war, environmental catastrophe.

Schatz 12 [Joe, Prof of English @ Binghamton The Importance of Apocalypse: The Value of End-of-the-World Politics While Advancing Ecocriticism, The Journal of Ecocriticism, p 26]

The foundation behind ontological approaches such as McWhorter’s is that we should refrain from acting even when we are met with the possibility of extinction. To clarify, it is not that current practices aren’t destructive from this perspective. For such critics, acting to overcome such destruction participates is the same kind of violence because it causes us to forget our relationship with the environment as we become actors over it. “Heidegger speaks of what he sees as the danger of dangers … [in this] kind of forgetfulness, a forgetfulness that Heidegger thought could result not only in nuclear disaster or environmental catastrophe, but in the loss of what makes us the kind of beings we are, beings who can think and who can stand in thoughtful relationship to things” (McWhorter 10). Once we forget that we are also part of the environment we empty our Being of any meaning and deprive ourselves of the very relationships that give us value in the first place.

### RC of Racism/Sexism

#### The aff fails to consider the original sin of “domestication” of animals – this laid the framework and justified colonialism, genocide, patriarchy, war, slavery and racism.

Best 7 – Associate Professor of Humanities and Philosophy @ UTEP

(Steven, Charles Patterson, the Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust, Journal for Critical Animal Studies, 1-4)

While a welcome advance over the anthropocentric conceit that only humans shape human actions, the environmental determinism approach typically fails to emphasize the crucial role that animals play in human history, as well as how the human exploitation of animals is a key cause of hierarchy, social conflict, and environmental breakdown. A core thesis of what I call “animal standpoint theory” is that animals have been key driving and shaping forces of human thought, psychology, moral and social life, and history overall. More specifically, animal standpoint theory argues that the oppression of human over human has deep roots in the oppression of human over animal. 1 In this context, Charles Patterson’s recent book, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust, articulates the animal standpoint in a powerful form with revolutionary implications. The main argument of Eternal Treblinka is that the human domination of animals, such as it emerged some ten thousand years ago with the rise of agricultural society, was the first hierarchical domination and laid the groundwork for patriarchy, slavery, warfare, genocide, and other systems of violence and power. A key implication of Patterson’s theory is that human liberation is implausible if disconnected from animal liberation, and thus humanism -- a speciesist philosophy that constructs a hierarchal relationship privileging superior humans over inferior animals and reduces animals to resources for human use -- collapses under the weight of its logical contradictions. Patterson lays out his complex holistic argument in three parts. In Part I, he demonstrates that animal exploitation and speciesism have direct and profound connections to slavery, colonialism, racism, and anti-Semitism. In Part II, he shows how these connections exist not only in the realm of ideology – as conceptual systems of justifying and underpinning domination and hierarchy – but also in systems of technology, such that the tools and techniques humans devised for the rationalized mass confinement and slaughter of animals were mobilized against human groups for the same ends. Finally, in the fascinating interviews and narratives of Part III, Patterson describes how personal experience with German Nazism prompted Jewish to take antithetical paths: whereas most retreated to an insular identity and dogmatic emphasis on the singularity of Nazi evil and its tragic experience, others recognized the profound similarities between how Nazis treated their human captives and how humanity as a whole treats other animals, an epiphany that led them to adopt vegetarianism, to become advocates for the animals, and develop a far broader and more inclusive ethic informed by universal compassion for all suffering and oppressed beings. The Origins of Hierarchy "As long as men massacre animals, they will kill each other" –Pythagoras It is little understood that the first form of oppression, domination, and hierarchy involves human domination over animals. 2 Patterson’s thesis stands in bold contrast to the Marxist theory that the domination over nature is fundamental to the domination over other humans. It differs as well from the social ecology position of Murray Bookchin that domination over humans brings about alienation from the natural world, provokes hierarchical mindsets and institutions, and is the root of the long-standing western goal to “dominate” nature. 3 In the case of Marxists, anarchists, and so many others, theorists typically don’t even mention human domination of animals, let alone assign it causal primacy or significance. In Patterson’s model, however, the human subjugation of animals is the first form of hierarchy and it paves the way for all other systems of domination such as include patriarchy, racism, colonialism, anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust. As he puts it, “the exploitation of animals was the model and inspiration for the atrocities people committed against each other, slavery and the Holocaust being but two of the more dramatic examples.” 4 Hierarchy emerged with the rise of agricultural society some ten thousand years ago. In the shift from nomadic hunting and gathering bands to settled agricultural practices, humans began to establish their dominance over animals through “domestication.” In animal domestication (often a euphemism disguising coercion and cruelty), humans began to exploit animals for purposes such as obtaining food, milk, clothing, plowing, and transportation. As they gained increasing control over the lives and labor power of animals, humans bred them for desired traits and controlled them in various ways, such as castrating males to make them more docile. To conquer, enslave, and claim animals as their own property, humans developed numerous technologies, such as pens, cages, collars, ropes, chains, and branding irons. The domination of animals paved the way for the domination of humans. The sexual subjugation of women, Patterson suggests, was modeled after the domestication of animals, such that men began to control women’s reproductive capacity, to enforce repressive sexual norms, and to rape them as they forced breeding in their animals. Not coincidentally, Patterson argues, slavery emerged in the same region of the Middle East that spawned agriculture, and, in fact, developed as an extension of animal domestication practices. In areas like Sumer, slaves were managed like livestock, and males were castrated and forced to work along with females. In the fifteenth century, when Europeans began the colonization of Africa and Spain introduced the first international slave markets, the metaphors, models, and technologies used to exploit animal slaves were applied with equal cruelty and force to human slaves. Stealing Africans from their native environment and homeland, breaking up families who scream in anguish, wrapping chains around slaves’ bodies, shipping them in cramped quarters across continents for weeks or months with no regard for their needs or suffering, branding their skin with a hot iron to mark them as property, auctioning them as servants, breeding them for service and labor, exploiting them for profit, beating them in rages of hatred and anger, and killing them in vast numbers – all these horrors and countless others inflicted on black slaves were developed and perfected centuries earlier through animal exploitation. As the domestication of animals developed in agricultural society, humans lost the intimate connections they once had with animals. By the time of Aristotle, certainly, and with the bigoted assistance of medieval theologians such as St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, western humanity had developed an explicitly hierarchical worldview – that came to be known as the “Great Chain of Being” – used to position humans as the end to which all other beings were mere means. Patterson underscores the crucial point that the domination of human over human and its exercise through slavery, warfare, and genocide typically begins with the denigration of victims. But the means and methods of dehumanization are derivative, for speciesism provided the conceptual paradigm that encouraged, sustained, and justified western brutality toward other peoples. “Throughout the history of our ascent to dominance as the master species,” Patterson writes, “our victimization of animals has served as the model and foundation for our victimization of each other. The study of human history reveals the pattern: first, humans exploit and slaughter animals; then, they treat other people like animals and do the same to them.” 5 Whether the conquerors are European imperialists, American colonialists, or German Nazis, western aggressors engaged in wordplay before swordplay, vilifying their victims – Africans, Native Americans, Filipinos, Japanese, Vietnamese, Iraqis, and other unfortunates – with opprobrious terms such as “rats,” “pigs,” “swine,” “monkeys,” “beasts,” and “filthy animals.” Once perceived as brute beasts or sub-humans occupying a lower evolutionary rung than white westerners, subjugated peoples were treated accordingly; once characterized as animals, they could be hunted down like animals. 6 The first exiles from the moral community, animals provided a convenient discard bin for oppressors to dispose the oppressed. The connections are clear: “For a civilization built on the exploitation and slaughter of animals, the `lower’ and more degraded the human victims are, the easier it is to kill them.” 7 Thus, colonialism, as Patterson describes, was a “natural extension of human supremacy over the animal kingdom.” 8 For just as humans had subdued animals with their superior intelligence and technologies, so many Europeans believed that the white race had proven its superiority by bringing the “lower races” under its command. There are important parallels between speciesism and sexism and racism in the elevation of white male rationality to the touchstone of moral worth. The arguments European colonialists used to legitimate exploiting Africans – that they were less than human and inferior to white Europeans in ability to reason – are the very same justifications humans use to trap, hunt, confine, and kill animals. Once western norms of rationality were defined as the essence of humanity and social normality, by first using non-human animals as the measure of alterity, it was a short step to begin viewing odd, different, exotic, and eccentric peoples and types as non- or sub-human. Thus, the same criterion created to exclude animals from humans was also used to ostracize blacks, women, and numerous other groups from “humanity.” The oppression of blacks, women, and animals alike was grounded in an argument that biological inferiority predestined them for servitude. In the major strain of western thought, alleged rational beings (i.e., elite, white, western males) pronounce that the Other (i.e., women, people of color, animals) is deficient in rationality in ways crucial to their nature and status, and therefore are deemed and treated as inferior, subhuman, or nonhuman. Whereas the racist mindset creates a hierarchy of superior/inferior on the basis of skin color, and the sexist mentality splits men and women into greater and lower classes of beings, the speciesist outlook demeans and objectifies animals by dichotomizing the biological continuum into the antipodes of humans and animals. As racism stems from a hateful white supremacism, and sexism is the product of a bigoted male supremacism, so speciesism stems from and informs a violent human supremacism -- namely, the arrogant belief that humans have a natural or God-given right to use animals for any purpose they devise or, more generously, within the moral boundaries of welfarism and stewardship, which however was Judaic moral baggage official Chistianithy left behind.

## **Alt**

### **Global Suicide of Humanity**

#### **The global suicide of humanity is to be viewed as a thought experiment**

Kochi and Ordan – Professors at Queen’s University and Car Ilan University

(Tarik and Noam, An Argument for the Global Suicide of Humanity, e-journal, pg 3)

From the outset it is important to make clear that the argument for the¶ global suicide of humanity is presented as a thought experiment. The¶ purpose of such a proposal in response to Hawking is to help show¶ how a certain conception of modemity, of which his approach is¶ representative, is problematic. Taking seriously the idea of global¶ suicide is one way of throwing into question an ideology or dominant¶ discourse of modemist-humanist action. [3] By imagining an¶ alternative to the existing state of affairs, absurd as it may seem to¶ some readers by its nihilistic and radical ‘solution’, we wish to open up¶ a ground for a critical discussion of modernity and its negative impacts¶ on both human and non-human animals, as well as on the¶ environment. [4] In this respect, by giving voice to the idea of a¶ human-free world, we attempt to draw attention to some of the¶ asymmetries of environmental reality and to give cause to question¶ why attempts to build bridges from the human to the non-human have,¶ so far, been unavailing.

#### **Proposing the suicide of humanity allows us to challenge the idea of life-value**

Kochi and Ordan – Professors at Queen’s University and Car Ilan University

(Tarik and Noam, An Argument for the Global Suicide of Humanity, e-journal, pg 170

Through the idea of global suicide such an ethics re-¶ introduces a central question to the heart of moral reﬂection: To what¶ extent is the value of the continuation of human life worth the total¶ harm inﬂicted upon the life of all others? Regardless of whether an¶ individual ﬁnds the idea of global suicide abhorrent or ridiculous, this¶ question remains valid and relevant and will not go away, no matter¶ how hard we try to forget, suppress or repress it.¶ Finally, it is important to note that such a standpoint need not fall into¶ a version of green or eco-fascism that considers other forms of life¶ more important than the lives of humans. Such a position merely¶ replicates in reverse the speciesism of modern humanist thought any¶ choice between the eco-fascist and the humanist, colonial-speciesist¶ is thus a forced choice and is, in reality, a non-choice that should be¶ rejected. The point of proposing the idea of the global suicide of¶ humanity is rather to help identify the way in which we differentially¶ value different forms of life and guide our moral actions by rigidly¶ adhered to standards of life-value. Hence the idea of global suicide,¶ through its radicalism, challenges an ideological or culturally dominant¶ idea of life-value. Further, through confronting humanist ethics with its¶ own violence against the non-human, the idea of global suicide opens¶ up a space for dialectical reflection in which the utopian ideals of both¶ modern humanist and anti-humanist ethics may be comprehended in¶ relation to each other.

#### **Thought experiments allow us to realize new knowledge**

Malpas 2011 – an Australian philosopher, a professor at the University of Tasmania in Hobart

(Jeff, Thought Experiments, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Thought experiments are devices of the imagination used to investigate the nature of things. Thought experimenting often takes place when the method of variation is employed in entertaining imaginative suppositions. They are used for diverse reasons in a variety of areas, including economics, history, mathematics, philosophy, and physics. Most often thought experiments are communicated in narrative form, sometimes through media like a diagram. Thought experiments should be distinguished from thinking about experiments, from merely imagining any experiments to be conducted outside the imagination, and from psychological experiments with thoughts. They should also be distinguished from counterfactual reasoning in general, as they seem to require an experimental element.¶ The primary philosophical challenge of thought experiments is simple: How can we learn about reality (if we can at all), just by thinking? More precisely, are there thought experiments that enable us to acquire new knowledge about the intended realm of investigation without new data? If so, where does the new information come from if not from direct contact with the realm of investigation under consideration? Finally, how can we distinguish good from bad instances of such thought experiments? These questions seem urgent with respect to scientific thought experiments because most philosophers and historians of science “recognize them as an occasionally potent tool for increasing man's understanding of nature. […] Historically their role is very close to the double one played by actual laboratory experiments and observations. First, thought experiments can disclose nature's failure to conform to a previously held set of expectations. In addition, they can suggest particular ways in which both expectation and theory must henceforth be revised.” (Kuhn, 1977, p. 241 and 261) The questions are urgent regarding philosophical thought experiments because they play an important role in philosophical discourse. Philosophy without thought experiments seems unthinkable (see e.g., Myers, 1968).¶ There is widespread agreement that thought experiments play a central role both in philosophy and in the natural sciences and general acceptance of the importance and enormous influence and value of some of the well-known thought experiments in the natural sciences, like Maxwell's demon, Einstein's elevator or Schrödinger's cat. The 17th century saw some of its most brilliant practitioners in Galileo, Descartes, Newton, and Leibniz. And in our own time, the creation of quantum mechanics and relativity are almost unthinkable without the crucial role played by thought experiments. Much of ethics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind is based firmly on the results of thought experiments as well, including Searle's Chinese room or Putnam's twin earth. Philosophy, even more than the sciences, would be severely impoverished without thought experiments, which suggests that a unified theory of thought experiments is desirable to account for them in both the sciences and the humanities (see Cooper, 2005, pp. 329–330; Gähde, 2000).¶ There have been attempts to define “thought experiment”, but likely (contrary to Haggqvist, 2009) it will be better to leave the term loosely characterized, so as not to prejudice the investigation. Many of the most important concepts we deal with are like this, e.g., religion or democracy. A few more examples will circumscribe our subject matter well enough: Newton's bucket, Heisenberg's gamma-ray microscope, Parfit's people who split like an amoeba, Mary the colour scientist, and Thomson's violinist.

#### **Discussing global suicide can undermine our previous ideology**

Camus 1942 – author, journalist, philosopher and won the Algerian Nobel Peace Prize

(Albert, The Myth of Sisyphus, translated by Justin O’Brien, pg 5)

Suicide has never been dealt with except as a social¶ phenomenon. On the contrary, we are concerned here, at the outset,¶ with the relationship between individual thought and suicide. An¶ act like this is prepared within the silence of the heart, as is a great¶ work of art. The man himself is ignorant of it. One evening he¶ pulls the trigger or jumps. Of an apartment-building manager who¶ had killed himself I was told that he had lost his daughter five¶ years before, that be bad changed greatly since, and that that¶ experience had “undermined” him. A more exact word cannot be¶ imagined. Beginning to think is beginning to be undermined.¶ Society has but little connection with such beginnings. The worm¶ is in man’s heart. That is where it must be sought. One must follow¶ and understand this fatal game that leads from lucidity in the face¶ of existence to flight from light.¶ There are many causes for a suicide, and generally the most¶ obvious ones were not the most powerful. Rarely is suicide¶ committed (yet the hypothesis is not excluded) through reflection.¶ What sets off the crisis is almost always unverifiable. Newspapers¶ often speak of “personal sorrows” or of “incurable illness.” These¶ explanations are plausible. But one would have to know whether a¶ friend of the desperate man had not that very day addressed him¶ indifferently. He is the guilty one. For that is enough to precipitate¶ all the rancors and all the boredom still in suspension.[2]¶ But if it is hard to fix the precise instant, the subtle step when¶ the mind opted for death, it is easier to deduce from the act itself¶ the consequences it implies. In a sense, and as in melodrama,¶ killing yourself amounts to confessing. It is confessing that life is¶ too much for you or that you do not understand it. Let’s not go too¶ far in such analogies, however, but rather return to everyday¶ words. It is merely confessing that that “is not worth the trouble.”¶ Living, naturally, is never easy.

#### **Thinking of absurd ideas are just preempting what might be in the future**

Camus 1942 – author, journalist, philosopher and won the Algerian Nobel Peace Prize

(Albert, The Myth of Sisyphus, translated by Justin O’Brien, pg 10)

All great deeds and all great thoughts have a ridiculous¶ beginning. Great works are often born on a street-corner or in a¶ restaurant’s revolving door. So it is with absurdity. The absurd¶ world more than others derives its nobility from that abject birth.¶ In certain situations, replying “nothing” when asked what one is¶ thinking about may be pretense in a man. Those who are loved are¶ well aware of this. But if that reply is sincere, if it symbolizes that¶ odd state of soul in which the void be-comes eloquent, in which¶ the chain of daily gestures is broken, in which the heart vainly¶ seeks the link that will connect it again, then it is as it were the first¶ sign of absurdity.¶ It happens that the stage sets collapse. Rising, streetcar, four¶ hours in the office or the factory, meal, streetcar, four hours of¶ work, meal, sleep, and Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday¶ Friday and Saturday accord—¶ ing to the same rhythm—this path is easily followed most of¶ the time. But one day the “why” arises and everything begins in¶ that weariness tinged with amazement. “Begins”—this is¶ important. Weariness comes at the end of the acts of a mechanical¶ life, but at the same time it inaugurates the impulse of¶ consciousness. It awakens consciousness and provokes what¶ follows. What follows is the gradual return into the chain or it is¶ the definitive awakening. At the end of the awakening comes, in¶ time, the consequence: suicide or recovery. In itself weariness has¶ something sickening about it. Here, I must conclude that it is good.¶ For everything be-gins with consciousness and nothing is worth¶ anything except through it. There is nothing original about these¶ remarks. But they are obvious; that is enough for a while, during a¶ sketchy reconnaissance in the origins of the absurd. Mere¶ “anxiety,” as Heidegger says, is at the source of everything.¶ Likewise and during every day of an unillustrious life, time¶ carries us. But a moment always comes when we have to carry it.¶ We live on the future: “tomorrow,” “later on,” “when you have¶ made your way,” “you will understand when you are old enough.”¶ Such irrelevan-cies are wonderful, for, after all, it’s a matter of¶ dying. Yet a day comes when a man notices or says that he is¶ thirty. Thus he asserts his youth.

### **Reconceptualize Nature Module**

#### Vote neg to reconceptualize-The allows reflection on the dependency we have on every ecological system to prevent its destruction.

Crist 07 (Eileen Crist, Eileen Crist received her Bachelor's degree from Haverford College in sociology in 1982 and her doctoral degree from Boston University in 1994, also in sociology, with a specialization in life sciences and society, 2007, Beyond the Climate Crisis: A critique of climate change discourse, 29-55)

IN THE LAST FEW DECADES two momentous realizations have presented themselves to humanity. One, we are in the midst of an anthropogenic crisis of life— an extinction spasm and ecological unraveling that is heading the biosphere into an impoverished biogeological era. And two, in the course of history, especially the history Of domination-driven Western culture,' humanity has tended to deny or underestimate the mental life Of animals. Besides the coincidence of their timing, the coming into knowledge of biodiversity's collapse and of the hither to unrecognized richness of animal minds appear entirely unrelated events. Yet there is an urgent connection between the contraction of life's diversity and the dawning appreciation of animal minds: just as we are beginning to recognize that we share the Earth with beings Of extraordinary physical and mental complexity, we are losing that shared world. In this chapter I explore conceptual and historical links between the unraveling of life and the denigration of animal minds—links that have foreshadowed the present historical moment of grave loss. The exploitation of the biosphere and the deprecation Of animals stem from the same Source: the separatist regime humanity has created in which we have entitled ourselves to unlimited access to the planet on the (tacit or declared) grounds of self-ascribed superiority over other species in general, and animals in particular, But the connection between the destruction of biological wealth and the belittlement Of animals goes deeper than the obvious resonance Of colonizing the natural world while denigrating its nonhuman indigenes. I argue that the long-standing denial or disparagement of animal minds is causally implicated in the devastation of the biosphere. Through the portrayal of animals as inferior beings, and eventually even as mechanical entities, the objectification Of the natural world and its transformation into a domain of resources was vastly facilitated. As animals became successfully represented in dominant discourses as devoid of agency and experiential perspective —thereby becoming construable as means for human ends—a fortiori the (apparently) nonsentient domains of forests, rivers, meadows, oceans, deserts, and mountains (in fact, of any landscape or seascape) were made accessible to the human race without accountability or restriction. In our time, the interface between ecocide and animal minds is tragic and ironic. Just as humanity is beginning to acknowledge and document a largely unknown world—the inner world of animals — that very world, in its diversity of forms of awareness, is coming undone. Even as human beings are becoming more receptive to the viewpoint of human-animal evolutionary continuity (not just of physical plan but of mental structure as well), we are collapsing the biosphere whose plenum of beings we might appreciate and experience through this newfound understanding. We are in danger of physically constructing a world that is as indigent in minds as René Descartes conceptually constructed it to be. But the reality and significance of this event—of losing not only physical manifestations of diversity but diverse manifestations of mind as well—eludes most of humanity. We live in a time tipping us into a planetary physical-cum-consciousness monoculture, yet most people continue to ignore Nature, failing to recognize this horizon and remaining endlessly distracted by the noise of personal, cultural, economic, and political dramas.

### **Radical Environmentalism Module**

#### **Americans need to be persuaded quickly to change and in the past only radicals have been able to do this**

McKibben 1989 -- an American environmentalist, author, and journalist

(Bill, The End of Nature, pg 173-174)

THE INERTIA of AFFLUENCE, the push of poverty, the soaring¶ population—these and the other reasons listed earlier make me pes-¶ simistic about the chances that we will dramatically alter our ways¶ of thinking and living, that we will turn humble in the face of our¶ troubles.¶ A purely personal effort is, of course, just a gesture—a good ges-¶ ture, but a gesture. The greenhouse effect is the ﬁrst environmen-¶ tal problem we can’t escape by moving to the woods. There are no¶ personal solutions. There is no time to just decide we’ll raise en-¶ lightened children and they'll slowly change the world. (VVhen the¶ problem was that someone might drop the Bomb, it perhaps made¶ sense to hear and raise sane, well-adjusted children in the hope that¶ they’d help prevent the Bomb from being dropped. But the prob-¶ lem now is precisely too many children, well adjusted or otherwise.)¶ We have to be the ones to do it, and simply driving less won’t mat-¶ ter, except as a statement, a way to get other people—many other¶ people—to drive less. ‘Most people have to be persuaded, and per-¶ suaded quickly, to change.¶ But saying that something is difﬁcult is not the same as saying it¶ is impossible. After all, George Bush decided in the wake of the¶ 1988 heat that he was an environmentalist. Margaret Thatcher,¶ who in 198 5 had linked environmental groups with other “subver-¶ sives” as “the enemy within,” found the religion at about the same¶ time, after the death of the North Sea seals and the odyssey of the¶ Karin B, the wandering toxic-waste barge. “Protecting the balance¶ of nature,” she said, is “one of the great challenges of the twentieth¶ century.”¶ I’ve been using the analogy of slavery throughout this discussion:¶ we feel it our privilege (and we feel it a necessity) to dominate na-¶ ture to our advantage, as whites once dominated blacks. When one¶ method of domination seems to be ending—the reliance on fossil¶ fuels, say—we cast about for another, like genetic tinkering, much¶ as Americans replaced slavery with Jim Crow segregation. How-¶ ever, in my lifetime that ofﬁcial segregation ended. Through their¶ courage, men and women like Martin Luther King and Fannie¶ Lou Hamer managed to harness the majority’s better qualities-¶ idealism, love for one’s neighbor—to transform the face of Ameri-¶ can society. Racism, it is true, remains virulent, but the majority of¶ Americans have voted for legislators who passed laws—radical¶ laws—mandating afﬁrmative action programs. Out of some higher¶ motive (and, of course, some base motives, such as the fear of black¶ revolt), whites have sacriﬁced at least a little potential wealth and¶ power. It would be wrong to say categorically that such a shift¶ couldn’t happen with regard to the environment—that a mixture of¶ fear and the love for nature buried in most of us couldn’t rise to the¶ surface. Some small but signiﬁcant steps have been taken. Los An-¶ geles, for instance, recently enacted a series of laws to improve air¶ quality that will change at least the edges of the lives of every resi-¶ dent. Los Angelenos will drive different cars, tum in their gas-¶ powered lawn mowers, start their barbecues without lighter ﬂuid.

#### **Recent society has moved away from the idea of Earth as sacred and radical environmentalism allows the transition back to Earth being able to flourish**

Luers 2005 – political activist and helped established the organization Red Cloud Thunder

(Jeff, A Brief Description of Radical Environmentalism)

There is a common misconception that radical environmental struggle is a relatively new form of protest. However, the history of eco-defense is nearly as old as the human race itself. Many indigenous cultures around the world held the Earth and their surroundings as sacred. Social rules prescribed how the land and water that gave life to the people were to be treated and honored.¶ It is only in the last several hundred years that human societies have moved away from these beliefs. The modern world has increasingly lost touch with its wild roots. This lack of understanding and respect for the Earth has allowed the wanton destruction of our planet. This tragedy no longer affects the wild but humans as well.¶ There is no human in the world that can pass a blood toxin test for dioxin-a carcinogenic or teratogenic by-products of most industry. There is no ocean fish uncontaminated by mercury or PCBs. There is no escape from global warming. That is the reality of the 21st century.¶ Over the years, the radical environmental movement has evolved not only in the escalation of tactics, but in political theory as well. Many radical environmentalists recognize the connections between capitalism, oppression and the destruction of the planet. Indeed, the connections are obvious to any student of globalization.¶ Wealthy nations use imperialist policies to gain access to developing poorer nations, stealing their resources and implementing sub-par industrial methods-which pollute and toxify far beyond the standards of rich countries. Back at home, the same practices are used. Dangerous factories, toxic waste dumps and incinerators are built in communities predominantly of people of color or low income. These communities often get little say in environmental impact reports or the decision making process. In fact, state and industry response to resistance of such noxious facilities is the age old excuse of providing jobs to those in need.¶ While I can not speak on behalf of the movement, it is my perception that it is motivated (in part) by a sense of deep ecology. The belief that all life is interconnected from plant to animal to forest to ocean to the world at large. It is this connection and interdependence that creates the Earth as we know it and allows life to flourish. When one habitat or species is affected by pollution or global warming, it creates a chain reaction that affects the entire network of life.¶ It is because of this belief that the majority of political and radical environmentalists work to bring communities together. Not only to challenge state and corporate practices but to learn to create alternatives to them. It is only by developing alternatives to capitalism and harmful industry that we can create a world not motivated by profit-rather, one based on sustainability and the amount of good we can bring all people, not just a handful of rich elite.

### Eliminate Dualism Module

#### The alternative is to engage the world in a terracentric model. We should conceptualize humanity and nature as one and not evaluate the earth in economic terms – other worldviews culminate in the destruction of the Earth

Marshall and Bormann 10 - ecologists

(Bruce and Frank, “The Earth has its own set of rules: Our view of nature is based on our human desire for more, and that economic model is broken,” Los Angeles Times, 2-3)

To achieve a more accurate model of our relation to nature, we need to see ourselves as part of nature, governed by nature (not economics), beholden to nature for ecosystem services and subject to nature's disturbances. We need to view our existence in nature as dependent on numerous functions we are unable to perform ourselves, and without which we couldn't survive. And we need to recognize that we now have the power and the reckless inclination, driven by shortsighted anthropocentrism, to disrupt these functions to the degree that Earth will become uninhabitable for us. In the end, the physical, chemical and biological rules of Earth will certainly win, and we will either be on the winning side or we will be vanquished. These are the only choices. Our anthropocentric economic model needs to be reconceived, incorporating Earth's rules, to become an Earth-centered, "terracentric" model. Stewardship needs to progress from a condescending view of humans tending their "garden" to an effort to become part of Earth without disrupting its vital functions. Ecosystem services need to advance from recognition of services to humans to recognition of services to our planet. We need to find ways to avoid changing Earth in irreversible directions. We need to soberly evaluate anthropocentric economics' sacred cow, growth, in light of sustainability. And we need to think beyond our own brief lifetimes. Most important, in the new terracentric model, we need to acknowledge that there is nothing more important than preserving the viability of planet Earth. Nothing.

### AT: “Permutation”

#### **Framing DA: incorporation of the plan invalidates the post-humanist gesture of our alternative—causes it to be lost in human-centered politics**.

Papadopoulos 10 (Dimitris, Reader in Sociology and Organisation University of Leicester, Epherema vol 10 “Insurgent posthumanism” 2010)

It is true that left politics have largely ignored the complexity and unpredictability of the entanglement between a deeply divided society and that of a deeply divided nonhuman world. The principle avenue for social transformation, at least in the main conceptualisations of the political left 3 , passes through seizing the centres of social and political power. The dominant motivation for left politics after the revolutions of 1848 (and definitely since 1871) has been how to conquer institutional power and the state. Within this matrix of radical left thinking the posthumanist moment becomes invalidated, subsumed to a strategy focused solely on social power. But here I want to argue that a post-humanist gesture can be found at the heart of processes of left political mobilisations that create transformative institutions and alternatives. This was the case even when such moves were distorted at the end, neutralised or finally appropriated into a form of left politics solely concerned with institutional representation and state power. What such an appropriation conceals is that a significant part of the everyday realities put to work through radical left struggles have always had a strong posthumanist character through their concentration on remaking the mundane material conditions of existence beyond and outside an immediate opposition to the state. In what follows I will try to excavate this posthumanist gesture from the main narratives of radical left political struggles along the following three fault lines: the first is about the exit from an alienated and highly regulated relation to the material, biological and technological realms through the making of a self-organised common world – a move from enclosed and separated worlds governed by labour to the making of ecological commons. A second posthumanist move is one that attacks the practice of politics as a matter of idea and institutions and rehabilitates politics as an embodied and everyday practice – an exit from the representational mind to the embodiment of politics. Finally, the third, involves the decentring of the human subject as the main actor of history making. History is a human affair but it is not made (only) by certain groups of humans – a move towards a post-anthropocentric history.

#### The permutation devolves into self-serving rationalizations—ethical compromises are unacceptable.

Lupisella & Logsdon 97 (Mark, masters degree in philosophy of science at university of Maryland and researcher working at the Goddard Space Flight Center, and John, Director, Space Policy Institute The George Washington University, Washington, “DO WE NEED A COSMOCENTRIC ETHIC?” <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.25.7502>)

Steve Gillett has suggested a hybrid view combining homocentrism as applied to terrestrial activity combined with biocentrism towards worlds with indigenous life.32 Invoking such a patchwork of theories to help deal with different domains and circumstances could be considered acceptable and perhaps even desirable especially when dealing with something as varied and complex as ethics. Indeed, it has a certain common sense appeal. However, instead of digging deeply into what is certainly a legitimate epistemological issue, let us consider the words of J. Baird Callicott: “But there is both a rational philosophical demand and a human psychological need for a self-consistent and all-embracing moral theory. We are neither good philosophers nor whole persons if for one purpose we adopt utilitarianism, another deontology, a third animal liberation, a fourth the land ethic, and so on. Such ethical eclecticism is not only rationally intolerable, it is morally suspect as it invites the suspicion of ad hoc rationalizations for merely expedient or self-serving actions.”33

### AT: Eco Pragmatism

#### The New Environmentalism Will Lead Us to Disaster

Hamilton, 14 -- Professor of Public Ethics at the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics and the Vice-Chancellor's Chair in Public Ethics at Charles Sturt University - - http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-new-environmentalism-will-lead-us-to-disaster/

Fourteen years ago, when a frustrated Paul Crutzen blurted out the word “Anthropocene” at a scientific meeting in Mexico, the famous atmospheric chemist was expressing his despair at the scale of human damage to Earth. So profound has been the influence of humans, Nobelist Crutzen and his colleagues later wrote, that the planet has entered a new geologic epoch defined by a single, troubling fact: The “human imprint on the global environment has now become so large and active that it rivals some of the great forces of nature in its impact on the functioning of the Earth system.” The science behind Crutzen’s claim is extensive and robust, and it centers on the profound and irreversible changes brought by global warming. Yet almost as soon as the idea of the Anthropocene took hold, people began revising its meaning and distorting its implications. A new breed of ecopragmatists welcomed the epoch as an opportunity. They have gathered around the Breakthrough Institute, a “neogreen” think tank founded by Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus, the authors of a controversial 2004 paper, “The Death of Environmentalism.” They do not deny global warming; instead they skate over the top of it, insisting that whatever limits and tipping points the Earth system might throw up, human technology and ingenuity will transcend them. As carbon dioxide concentrations pass 400 ppm for the first time in a million years, and scientists warn of a U.S. baking in furnacelike summers by the 2070s, Shellenberger and Nordhaus wrote that by the end of the century “nearly all of us will be prosperous enough to live healthy, free and creative lives.” The answer, they say, is not to change course but to more tightly “embrace human power, technology and the larger process of modernization.” The argument absolves us all of the need to change our ways, which is music to the ears of political conservatives.

# Aff Answers

## Framework

#### Philosophical justifications for environmental plan action fails. Debates that focus on human focus are conducive for change.

Light ‘2 Associate professor of philosophy and environmental policy at George Mason University [Andrew, “Contemporary Environmental Ethics From Metaethics to Public Philosophy,” Metaphilosophy 33.4]

Even with the ample development in the field of various theories designed to answer these questions, I believe that environmental ethics is, for the most part, not succeeding as an area of applied philosophy. For while the dominant goal of most work in the field, to find a philosophically sound basis for the direct moral consideration of nature, is commendable, it has tended to engender two unfortunate results: (1) debates about the value of nature as such have largely excluded discussion of the beneficial ways in which arguments for environmental protection can be based on human interests, and relatedly (2) the focus on somewhat abstract concepts of value theory has pushed environmental ethics away from discussion of which arguments morally motivate people to embrace more supportive environmental views. As a consequence, those agents of change who will effect efforts at environmental protection – namely, humans – have oddly been left out of discussions about the moral value of nature. As a result, environmental ethics has been less able to contribute to cross-disciplinary discussions with other environmental professionals (such as environmen- tal sociologists or lawyers) on the resolution of environmental problems, especially those professionals who also have an interest in issues concern- ing human welfare in relation to the equal distribution of environmental goods. But can environmental philosophy afford to be quiescent about the public reception of ethical arguments over the value of nature? The original motivations for environmental philosophers to turn their philosophical insights to the environment belie such a position. Environmental philosophy evolved out of a concern about the state of the growing environmental crisis and a conviction that a philosophical contribution could be made to the resolution of this crisis. If environmental philosophers spend most of their time debating non-human-centered forms of value theory, they will arguably never be able to make such a contribution.

## Permutation

#### “Anthropocentrism” is meaningless. To determine an optimal solution we must reject labels and look at debate pragmatically.

Katz 99 --- Student of Philosophy at UC Berkeley

(Eric, *Environmental Ethics*, Volume 21, Issue 4, Winter 1999 Pages 377-390 DOI: 10.5840/enviroethics19992144)

Thus, if the beach is an artifactual system, the question to be asked changes: What is the pragmatic difference between anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism regarding the policy of beach replenishment for a nonnatural artifactual beach system?¶ The anthropocentric argument appears essentially to be the same as before. We still want to promote human interests by saving and preserving the beach— only now we recognize that it is not a natural beach, but an artifactual one. We are still going to preserve the island for human benefits and human interests. We still want to protect the private homes and provide a recreational beach. We can even argue that the artifactual beach system is necessary to protect the relatively undisturbed wilderness area that lies on the landward side of the dunes. The anthropocentric argument thus does not change. ¶ However, the nonanthropocentric ecological holistic argument is now largely irrelevant, for we are only dealing with an artifactual system, or at best a hybrid of natural and artifactual. Such a system is essentially human-based, so that human interests and concerns dominate any evaluation. I have previously analyzed the difference between artifacts and natural entities—and I will not repeat arguments I have made in some detail in other places. I have argued that it is the presence of human intentionality in a natural system that irrevocably modifies nature and establishes an artifactual system. The introduction of human purpose is the key to understanding the difference between artifactual and natural systems. The reason why we create artifacts, why we interfere in natural processes, is to further human goals and interests. We tend to evaluate the worth of our artifacts and human-made systems by their success in achieving our human-centered aims. Thus, we will value the Fire Island system to the extent that it meets our aims and goals. We cannot return Fire¶ Island to a “natural” state. Thus, we cannot use what is beneficial to the overall ecological community as the sole guide to environmental decision-making. We must consider the satisfaction of human interests in the evaluation of environmental policies on Fire Island. As an artifactual system—or as a hybrid of the natural and the artifactual—Fire Island must be evaluated from a perspective that includes anthropocentrism. Thus, Fire Island will have to be managed— perhaps preserved in terms of long-range sustainability—so that it best achieves the human goals that have been incorporated into its development.¶ In this case, pragmatism as a methodology—as a means of testing theoretical ideas for their “cash-value” in terms of practical consequences—teaches us that a simplistic reliance on theoretical concepts such as anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism will fail to address adequately the complexities of the policy situation. Pragmatism endorses a vision beyond the facile dualisms of nonanthropocentrism and anthropocentrism, natural and artifactual. Without resorting to the substantive content of pragmatism as a moral philosophy, we can see the need for flexibility, compromise, and a pluralism of values in the analysis of concrete environmental policy decisions. When dealing with a hybrid system of humanity and nature, we need to use all of the relevant theoretical concepts, crossing and recrossing the boundaries that separate anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism. Pragmatism cannot, in the end, tell us how to effect the compromise; it cannot tell us what specific policies we should adopt in all situations. Pragmatism simply reminds us to be open to a wide range of possibly relevant and meaningful values in the formation and justification of policy.

#### Neg’s definition of anthropocentrism is flawed; they refer to “strong anthropocentrism” while the aff plan supports “weak anthropocentrism”.

Afeissa 08

(Hicham-Stéphane, SAPIENS 1.1, *The Transformative value of Ecological Pragmatism*, 18 June 2008)

The second argument makes the point that the discussion between anthropocentrists and non-anthropocentrists is particularly futile insofar as the major concept of "human interests" (or human utility), on which the whole discussion focuses, is left very much undefined. The fact that satisfying human interests does not necessarily involve the irreversible destruction of the object of desire is insufficiently noted: there is a distinction to be made between utility which is satisfied by the immediate consumption of natural goods (raw materials, agricultural products, etc.) and a utility which implies the conservation of the useful object since conservation is a prerequisite for satisfying human interests (this is the case for all the ecological services provided by nature without which we would very soon be deprived of any access to consumer goods). More generally, far from being no more than a source of raw materials or an open-air dumping ground for our waste, nature can have an aesthetic, moral, spiritual or scientific value for humans. In this case, so that the satisfaction nature provides can endure, the object must remain intact since satisfaction is in a way inseparable from the object itself, to the point of being inherent to it—making it possible, so to speak, to assign a educational, (and no longer metaphysical) meaning to the concept of intrinsic value, inasmuch as the objects of satisfaction are not considered to be indefinitely and indiscriminately substitutable.¶ From this stems the concept of distinguishing, as Norton did in the early 1980s, between "strong anthropocentrism" and "weak (or extended) anthropocentrism. Only the latter is capable of not under-estimating the diversity of instrumental values that humans may derive from the natural world, and correlatively not homogenising the plurality of interests or preferences they experience (a spontaneous "feeling" of preference is essentially different from a "considered" preference which is mediated by a given vision of the world). A theory is said to be strongly anthropocentrist if all the natural values it recognises are related to the satisfaction of preferences felt by human beings. A theory of value is said to be weakly anthropocentrist if all the natural values which it recognises are related to the influence exerted by a given "felt" preference on the ideals which structure the vision of the world (and on which are essentially based "considered" preferences).

#### Weak anthropocentrism has regard for environment and aims for sustainability.

Hettinger ND --- Prof of Environmental Ethics at College of Charleston

(Ned, The [Question](http://hettingern.people.cofc.edu/Environmental_Ethics/Moral_Standing_and_Anthropocentrism.htm) of Moral Standing or Intrinsic Value and the Anthropocentric [Answer](http://hettingern.people.cofc.edu/Environmental_Ethics/Moral_Standing_and_Anthropocentrism.htm), No Date, <http://hettingern.people.cofc.edu/Environmental_Ethics/Moral_Standing_and_Anthropocentrism.htm>)

Strong anthropocentrism: All and only humans have moral standing or intrinsic value. (This is what we will mean by the phrase and is Aquinas', Kant's and Baxter's view ("I have no interest in preserving penguins for their own sake; penguins are important because people enjoy seeing them walk on rocks.")¶ Nonhumans are mere instruments to human benefit; a mere means to human ends. Earth as a human resource.¶ We have no duties to nonhumans, but only duties to other humans pertaining to nonhumans.¶ Can have a strong env. ethic: Important to protect the environment for the sake of people (not for its own sake)¶ Weak anthropocentrism: Literally 'anthropocentrism' suggests that morality should be centered on humans and that nonhumans are of peripheral moral concern.¶ On this view, humans are at the center of moral concern; humans are superior; humans matter more than other beings. (This suggests that nonhumans intrinsically matter some, and thus weak anthropocentrism is not compatible with strong anthropocentrism for it claims only humans matter).¶ Weak anthropocentrists need to work out answers to these questions:: Is the claim that any individual human is more important than any individual nonhuman? That any human interest (no matter how trivial) is more important than any nonhuman interest? That the human species as a whole is more important than all of the millions of other species on earth combined? That one individual human is more important than an entire species of nonhumans?

#### Our weak anthropocentric view avoids controversy and is a better environmental ethic than radical environmental reform and non-anthropocentrism.

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(Beth, *The Environmental Crisis: Why We Need Anthropocentrism*, April 2009)

With a working explanation of our weakly anthropocentric, non-individualistic, environmental ethic we can now outline how it speaks to issues in a way most environmentalists would appreciate. In other words, this ethic tells us to do things that environmentalists already think we should do- reduce, reuse, recycle, develop alternative energy, protect species, eliminate pollution, and reduce greenhouse emissions, etc. As such, it could satisfy many environmentalists as a way to justify their goals to themselves and a wider audience. Considered preferences of a weakly anthropocentric ethic can include all of these objectives, based on a rational worldview that values ecological diversity, harmony with nature, and human existence. The first two are easily justified, and the third is a firm conviction widely held, as discussed above. Ecological diversity is valuable to humans for myriad reasons, such as medicine, scenic views, education and tasty foods. Many believe that harmony with nature is important to our spiritual development, or the formation of human values. It is not difficult to imagine a rational worldview that respects these values, and many already exist and are followed today (e.g., Hinduism, Jainism). Even the major religions of the Judeo-Christian tradition can inform considered preferences such as these, which will be a major advantage to our view.¶ The weakly anthropocentric view avoids the difficulties of justifying an environmental ethic from either end of the spectrum. On one hand, it avoids controversy over the existence of intrinsic value in non-human organisms, objects, and ecological systems. This is one important characteristic of a nonanthropocentric ethic like Deep Ecology– finding intrinsic value in all living things. By intrinsic value, I mean value that exists independent of any observer to give it value. For example, a nonanthropocentric ethicist would see value in an animal that no human could ever benefit from or even know about, simply because of what it is. While possibly justifiable, an ethic that treats all living things and possibly even ecological systems as intrinsically valuable may seem very radical to a large portion of the public. It seems that even the philosophical community remains divided on the issue. On the other hand, our ethic avoids making felt human desire the loci of all value by showing how considered human values can explain the value in our environment. In other words, what humans value, either directly or indirectly, generates value in the environment. In this way, we avoid unchecked felt preferences that would not be able to explain why excessive human consumption is wrong. Avoiding these controversial stances will contribute substantially to the first advantage of a weakly anthropocentric environmental ethic: public appeal.

## Alt Solvency

#### **Argument over anthropocentricity divides environmental activists and undermines effective reform – turns the K**

Afeissa 08

(Hicham-Stéphane, SAPIENS 1.1, *The Transformative value of Ecological Pragmatism*, 18 June 2008)

The first of these puts forward the necessarily militant component of environmental ethics in its role as an emerging field of research. In this respect, there are only two possible outcomes: either environmental ethicists genuinely aim to guide policies by subjecting them to relatively rational rules, in which case their failure to achieve this objective so far should encourage them to consider, firstly, what it is in their way of expressing and dealing with problems that has prevented them from succeeding, and secondly, to adapt their discursive strategy to the realities of politics; or else the theorists of environmental ethics choose to pursue their metaphysical wrangles over the status of the intrinsic value of natural entities, over the possibility of considering ecosystems from a moral standpoint and other issues such as the number of angels who can dance on the head of a pin, in which case they need to decide once and for all whether they really care about the current ecological crisis.¶ According to Norton, what actually matters as regards the environment, is not so much taking principled stances, but rather developing rational aids to decision-making, so that the various actors can agree on what should be done and develop the concrete policy measures which need to be implemented. In this sense, petty in-fighting between anthropocentrists and non-anthropocentrists, humanists and ecocentrists, "shallow" and "deep ecologists", etc., are all the more damaging that they divide environmental ethicists and stifle efforts for concerted and effective action.

#### Non-anthropocentric environmental ethics has an inherently pessimistic view of humans. Transcending this negative mindset allows humans to live a more ecological lifestyle.

Richards 11 --- Alumni of Haverford College

(Tim, *Beyond Environmental Morality: Towards a Viable Environmental Ethic(s),* The International Journal of Environmental, Cultural, Economic, and Social Sustainability, Volume 7, Number 2, published 2011)

What is wrong with environmental ethics? Who could impugn such an ostensibly noble thing? I hold that modern environmental ethics is foremost among the forces that keep our species from evolving to be more ecologically adapted or environmentally friendly. The dialectic is approximately this: unwittingly, in fighting the actions and institutions that are degrading the environment, environmental activists, employing our modern environmental ethics, merely oppose the consciousness that created environmental problems to begin with – namely , that humans are separate from ‘nature’ and can use it however they wish. Activist remedies, therefore, will merely react negatively to this state of affairs; thus, we get the picture that humans and their economy are evil, nature and its economy is good, and that if we do not completely leave nature alone then we should at least inflict as little damage as possible. We inherit a portrait of human self-hatred where the best possible world, ecologically speaking, is one devoid of the human species entirely. With such a flawed guiding vision, it is little wonder that the environmental movement has yet to gain sweeping power and reforms globally.¶ It is my view that morality is a failed vehicle for handling environmental problems. For example, though we know that our burning of fossil fuels is environmentally destructive and bad for our health, we are forced to do so anyway because our current industrial system has evolved upon this premise. Moralize as much as we like, finger wagging and admonishment will not change the basis of our economy – we still drive our cars, use our coal-fired power, and rely on extractive industries. Decrying such activities as evil merely opposes these practices and contributes nothing to forward a fundamentally different alternative, neither intellectually nor practically. ¶ Reframing the basic story and approach such that we humans, as an integral part of nature, can contribute positively as vital, productive parts of the whole would represent an explosion of the superstructure of what is presently considered possible. Once we transcend environmental dualism and contemporary environmental morality, all manner of ideas and possibilities emerge, as if on the dawn of a new day. Humans do not have to be detrimental to the environment; we are not fundamentally flawed in this respect despite what environmental moralists might say. By going beyond the contemporary environmental morality and environmental dualism exemplified by modern environmental ethics as a field, we as ethical thinkers and activists can begin to be effective in our efforts to advocate for a more ecologically adapted society with environmentally conscious lifestyles.

#### Thinking of industry and human civilization as “bad” restricts reform that can occur; the only way to improve our environmental impact is to view industry as a means of change.

Richards 11 --- Alumni of Haverford College

(Tim, *Beyond Environmental Morality: Towards a Viable Environmental Ethic(s),* The International Journal of Environmental, Cultural, Economic, and Social Sustainability, Volume 7, Number 2, published 2011)

As mentioned in the Overture, I think that our species can actually be environmentally ‘good’ in two ways, both industrially with respect to manufacturing processes and developmentally with respect to land use. Accepting this possibility entails dire consequences for the contemporary environmental morality that has thus far dominated the environmental ethical discourse. With this alternative idea as a starting point, we are freed to employ an entirely different environmental ethical narrative, one that opens new perspectives on long-standing impasses and permits creative thinking for alternative solutions rather than solutions that are entrenched in the past and sanctimoniously seek to curb global destruction. However, this is a view that certainly requires a bit of explanation. For these ideas I am indebted to William McDonough and Michael Braungart, authors of the 2002 groundbreaking book on ecological design, Cradle-to-Cradle. The philosophical significance of this book cannot be understated.¶ McDonough and Braungart begin their book by discussing the possibility of a new industrial revolution.¶ They address contemporary environmental morality: ¶ We are accustomed to thinking of industry and the environment as being at odds with each other, because conventional methods of extraction, manufacture, and disposal are destructive to the natural world. Environmentalists often characterize business as bad and industry itself (and the growth it demands) as inevitably destructive (C2C p. 6-7, emphasis mine).¶ We see that the operative contemporary environmental morality we currently hold is merely a product of the way that industrialization has happened to evolve. This historical contingency has led to a dichotomy/dualism that is a bane for both environmental activists and industry. The message activists broadcast to the public in order to become more environmentally friendly is cast in solely negative terms – stop doing X, do less of Y , be less environmentally ‘bad.’¶ Such messages are problematic in McDonough and Braungart’s eyes for two reasons. Firstly, these messages are based on a historical contingency that environmentalists are seeking to change – namely, that of industrialization as it is. However, in trying to change this, the message is merely cast in opposition to that reality from within its very paradigm. We quickly come to a moot point, because the only way for us to be environmentally good is to restrict the bad modus operandi – but in so doing, we keep the very same systems in place, merely with restraints and regulations. Thus, we perpetuate the fundamentally destructive processes and systems, but allow their operation to extend over a longer period of time as we make them more efficient and less destructive. As the authors write, “being ‘less bad’ is no good” (C2C p. 45). Secondly, the negative messages are not inspiring – making people feel bad is not an effective way to inspire creative, positive change.

#### The environmental community functions in an anthropocentric framework—accepting this is critical for philosophers to make real contributions to environmental policy.

**Light**, **02**. Associate professor of philosophy and environmental policy, and director of the Center for Global Ethics at George Mason University.

(Andrew, “Contemporary Environmental Ethics From Metaethics to Public Philosophy,” Metaphilosophy 33.4, Ebsco.)

In addition to the reasons offered above, there are at least two practical reasons for reconsidering the rejection of anthropocentrism to consider as well. First, consider that the focus in environmental ethics on the search for a description of the nonanthropocentric value of nature also separates it from other forms of environmental inquiry. Most other environmental professionals look at environmental problems in a human context rather than try to define an abstract sense of natural value outside the human appreciation of interaction with nature. Fields like environmental sociol- ogy and environmental health, for example, are concerned not with the environment per se but with the environment as the location of human community. This is not to say that these fields reduce the value of nature to a crude resource instrumentalism. It is to say instead that they realize that a discussion of nature outside the human context impedes our ability to discuss ways in which anthropogenic impacts on nature can be under- stood and ameliorated. If environmental philosophers continue to pursue their work only as a contribution to value theory, they cut themselves off from the rest of the environmental community, which seeks to provide practical solutions to environmental problems, solutions that it is almost trite these days to suggest must be interdisciplinary. One may fairly wonder how environmental philosophers can make a contribution to something other than value theory. After all, what else are they trained to do as philosophers? My claim is that if philosophers could help to articulate moral reasons for environmental policies in a way that is translatable to the general anthropocentric intuitions of the public, they will have made a contribution to the resolution of environmental problems commensurate with their talents. But making such a contribution may require doing environmental philosophy in some different ways. At a mini- mum it requires a more public philosophy, as the American pragmatist philosopher John Dewey envisioned, though one more focused on making the kind of arguments that resonate with the moral intuitions that most people carry around with them on an everyday basis.

#### Human-centeredness is a pre-requisite to care for the environment

Light 2 – Professor of environmental philosophy

(Andrew Light, professor of environmental philosophy and director of the Environmental Conservation Education Program, 2002, Applied Philosophy Group at New York University, METAPHILOSOPHY, v33, n4, July, p. 561)

It should be clear by now that endorsing a method­ological environmental pragmatism requires an ac­ceptance of some form of anthropocentrism in envi­ronmental ethics, if only because we have sound empirical evidence that humans think about the value of nature in human terms and pragmatists insist that we must pay attention to how humans think about the value of nature. Indeed, as I said above, it is a common presupposition among committed nonan­thropocentrists that the proposition that humans are anthropocentrist is true, though regrettable. There are many problems involved in the wholesale rejec­tion of anthropocentrism by most environmental philosophers. While I cannot adequately explain my reservations to this rejection, for now I hope the reader will accept the premise that not expressing reasons for environmental priorities in human terms seriously hinders our ability to communicate a moral basis for better environmental policies to the public. Both anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric claims should be open to us.

#### Anthropocentrism is critical to protect the environment

Watson, 07. Professor at the Department of Psychology in the University of Iowa. (David, “Conservative anthropocentrism provides the best basis and framework for an environmental ethic,")

Opponents of a conservative anthropocentric environmental ethic will object to the priority of human survival in an environmental ethic. Those who oppose any anthropocentric ethic would look to the concept of value to support their argument. They would claim that other members of the biosphere possess intrinsic value and that their value cannot be considered less than that of a human. Thus, other members of the biosphere cannot be sacrificed for the betterment of humanity. According to such arguments, the intrinsic value of these other members prohibits any anthropocentric environmental ethic. Emotionally the arguments of the non-anthropocentrists have great appeal. Philosophically justified, moral and ethical theorists often gravitate to non-anthropocentric environmental ethics. However, there are several problems with the concepts they assert. Non-anthropocentrists claim that other members of the biosphere have intrinsic value, and this prohibits any anthropocentric environmental ethic. Compelling examples along these lines are often cited to justify non-anthropocentrism. The ‘slaughtering’ of animals such as cows, deer, or chickens for human use is wrong because the chickens and cows possess as much value as humans. However, whether or not these arguments are valid and justified is not the only consideration necessary. The discussions of philosophers and intellectuals are not the end of environmental ethics. The people of Western societies, as consumers of vast amounts of resources, must realize the importance of the other members of the biosphere if this issue is to be addressed. Humans are part of nature, or the biosphere, as are all other living and non-living entities on the earth. Though humanity often seems separate and distinct from nature, humans emerged from the already thriving biosphere. This earth has been the only home to humanity. Without the earth and its parts, the necessary conditions for the existence and survival of humanity are lacking. Environmental anthropocentrism does not necessitate an adversarial relationship between humans and the rest of nature, contrary to popular opinion. In fact, humanity has a great interest in the welfare of the biosphere: There is very good reason for thinking ecologically, and for encouraging human beings to act in such a way as to preserve a rich and balanced planetary ecology: human survival depends on it. (Massanari 45) Environmental ethics need to embrace anthropocentrism and the insights of conservation ethics. Human self-interest, regardless of its moral status, is present in human nature and culturally around the world. However, this self-interest and the direct relation it should have with the welfare of the biotic community is often overlooked. Instead of continuing the debate of whether to champion all members of the biosphere or to promote the advancement of humanity, we need to embrace all members of the biosphere in order to promote the advancement of humanity. There are many different factors that allow for life on earth, particularly human life. The ‘resources,’ as they are often called, necessary for the survival of humanity are limited. If the finite resources necessary for human life are gone, then the existence of humanity will no longer be viable on Earth. The recent trend of human attitude toward and interaction with the environment is frighteningly shortsighted. Only a sector of the scientific community attempts to address the potential environmental problems facing humanity in the near and distant future. Those that do, however, often express what seems like helpless concern: A great change in our stewardship of the earth and the life on it, is required, if vast human misery is to be avoided and our global home on this planet is not to be irretrievably mutilated. (“Warning to Humanity” 783) Looking only as far as twenty-five to fifty years into the future of the environment is commonly considered long-term thinking. More than likely, this will only be an intermediate point in the environmental change humans have caused. The future viability of life on the planet is necessary for human survival, and humanity can yet have a say in this future. Humans came about among a preexisting world of living and non-living agents. We are just one of many species that have inhabited, or do inhabit the earth. These various species serve different functions in the biosphere and are interdependent upon one another for the survival of themselves and the biosphere.

#### Human-centered ethics necessitate protecting the environment

Hwang, 03. Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Seoul National University. (Kyung-sig, “Apology for Environmental Anthropocentrism,” Asian Bioethics in the 21st Century)

The third view, which will be defended here, is that there is no need for a specifically ecological ethic to explain our obligations toward nature, that our moral rights and duties can satisfactorily be explained in terms of traditional, human-centered ethical theory.[4] In terms of this view, ecology bears on ethics and morality in that it brings out the far-reaching, extremely important effects of man's actions, that much that seemed simply to happen-extinction of species, depletion of resources, pollution, over rapid growth of population, undesirable, harmful, dangerous, and damaging uses of technology and science - is due to human actions that are controllable, preventable, by men and hence such that men can be held accountable for what occurs. Ecology brings out that, often acting from the best motives, however, simply from short-sighted self-interest without regard for others living today and for those yet to be born, brings about very damaging and often irreversible changes in the environment, changes such as the extinction of plant and animal species, destruction of wilderness and valuable natural phenomena such as forests, lakes, rivers, seas. Many reproduce at a rate with which their environment cannot cope, so that damage is done, to and at the same time, those who are born are ill-fed, ill-clad, ill-sheltered, ill-educated. Moralists concerned with the environment have pressed the need for a basic rethinking of the nature of our moral obligations in the light of the knowledge provided by ecology on the basis of personal, social, and species prudence, as well as on general moral grounds in terms of hitherto unrecognized and neglected duties in respect of other people, people now living and persons yet to be born, those of the third world, and those of future generation, and also in respect of preservation of natural species, wilderness, and valuable natural phenomena. Hence we find ecological moralists who adopt this third approach, writing to the effect that concern for our duties entail concern for our environment and the ecosystems it contains. Environmental ethics is concerned with the moral relation that holds between humans and the natural world, the ethical principles governing those relations determine our duties, obligations, and responsibilities with regard to the earth's natural environment and all the animals and plants inhabit it. A human-centered theory of environmental ethics holds that our moral duties with respect to the natural world are all ultimately derived from the duties we owe to one another as human beings. It is because we should respect the human rights, or should protect and promote the well being of humans, that we must place certain constraints on our treatment of the earth's environment and its non-human habitants.[5]

#### Environmental philosophers should orient themselves towards problem solving not abstract intellectualism

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(Avner, “The Environment: Between Theory and Practice,” p. 20, Questia.)

So animal rights philosophers have been missing the chance to find a way to many people's hearts. But why is this so crucial? I think it is crucial because it is the wrong way of practising political philosophy. To see why, let us recall a classical book by Max Weber (1968). In Politics als Beruf, Weber presented an important distinction between two approaches to moral reasoning. One is the 'ethics of conviction', which often follows deontology, or a set of rules of conduct; the other is the ethics of responsibility, according to which it would be irresponsible to act according to one's principles alone: rather, one should also consider what others will do as a result of one's actions. It seems to me that political philosophy has this approach in mind. Political philosophy should orient itself towards real-life problems, including the problem of public good and collective action, where people tend to react in certain undesirable ways to what others do. In such cases there must be a way of taking into account the effect that my actions have (we include here both what I claim to be doing and the reasons I give for doing it) on others' behaviour and actions. Political reasoning would then have two stages: first, a discussion of principles, but second, a consideration of their actual application and their effect on others' behaviour. However, many environmental philosophers, while ascribing rights to animals, ignore the way others may react. I believe that many people who might have been persuaded of the importance of treating animals fairly (using the argument of what cruelty can do to the human soul) will regard the notion of animal rights as so obscure or absurd that they dismiss as mad philosophers who suggest this idea, and scorn all such claims as nonsense.

#### Anthropocentrism is inevitable and a shift away from it only creates a win-lose dichotomy

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(Bradley and Edward, The Conservative Ecologist and Free Market Environmentalism: Classical Liberalism Reasserted, 7-8)

Anthropocentrism is blamed for every observed example of excess and irresponsible action. In this way, the collective ecological community (not simply the human community) is prioritized and valued above and beyond the values, actions and aspirations of human beings and especially individual human beings. Adherents to the most eco-centric perspectives on ecological sustainability are routinely encouraged to heed Leopold’s recommendation to “think like a mountain” and to relate to the world in ways that lie beyond the clear and inherent limitations of anthropocentrism (Norton, 2005). A Pragmatic Approach As a theoretical exercise Leopold’s advice is sound and worthy of consideration. However, from a pragmatic perspective, it fails precisely because human beings are necessarily anthropocentric in their orientation toward the world. This observation stands at the heart of my own work on “nested ecology” (Wimberley, 2009) where I assert that individual human beings of necessity relate to the world around them by way of their human senses, families, societies, culture and economies. This anthropocentric perspective is unavoidable and is fully consistent with the manner in which every other living creature on the planet relates to the environs surrounding them. Asking people to not be anthropocentric in their interactions or deriding them when they do so is not merely a matter of impracticality: it is an assault upon humanity itself. Taken to the extreme, Leopold’s land ethic implies that human welfare is of less consequence and importance than that of the larger ecological community on Earth. Thus a binomial “either-or” scenario is established in which there are winners and losers and where the ecological community can only “win” if the human community on Earth comparatively “loses” something or “loses itself.”

#### **Empirical evidence should be valued over thought experiments**

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(Andrew D., “V. On the value of thought experiments for science”, Thought experiments in scientific reasoning)

In contrast to such advantages, the limitations of thought experiments may be less readily apparent. The most important of these limitations is that a thought experiment, by definition, cannot introduce any new empirical data. As a result, we run the risk of being mislead by a thought experiment whenever the conclusion of a thought experiment goes beyond the information given in its premises or whenever such information is itself unjustified. Thought experiments are limited to whatever extent we are capable of drawing unwarranted conclusions from the evidence at hand.20 It must be remembered that the reason we believe thought experiments to be useful is because we believe that if they were carried out, the results would be as predicted. This is the case even with regard to counterfactual claims such as those concerning frictionless surfaces and the like. The claim in such cases is that if it were possible to construct a frictionless surface, then such-and-such would result. In the end, there is no test like a real test. The reason that thought experiments so often can be misleading is that behind almost every thought experiment will lie a large number of unquestioned auxiliary assumptions, assumptions which are assumed to be true but which, if false, would overturn the result in question. Thought experiments, despite their advantages, can never replace observation and actual experiment. For proof of this it need only be pointed out that, should a thought experiment and an actual experiment conflict, it will almost always be the thought experiment, not the physical experiment, which will have to be revised. As an example of the kinds of auxiliary assumptions present within a thought experiment, consider Galileo's famous thought experiment concerning falling bodies, presented as part of the dialogue during the first day of his Discorsi. The then contemporary Aristotelian theory held that the "natural speeds" of falling bodies were a function of their weight. Galileo's thought experiment vitiates this view, paving the way for a theory in which a body's "natural" acceleration is independent of its mass. The dialogue is between Salviati and Simplicio:21 SALVIATI But, even without further experiment, it is possible to prove clearly by means of a short and conclusive argument, that a heavier body does not move more rapidly than a lighter one.... But tell me, Simplicio, whether you admit that each falling body acquires a definite speed fixed by nature, a velocity which cannot be increased or diminished except by the use of force [violenza] or resistance. SIMPLICIO There can be no doubt but that one and the same body moving in a single medium has a fixed velocity which is determined by nature and which cannot be increased except by the addition of momentum [impeto] or diminished except by some resistance which retards it. SAWIATI If then we take two bodies whose natural speeds are different, it is clear that on uniting the two, the more rapid one will be partly retarded by the slower, and the slower will be somewhat hastened by the swifter. Do you not agree with me in this opinion? SIMPLICIO You are unquestionably right. SALVIATI But if this is true, and if a large stone moves with a speed of, say, eight while a smaller moves with a speed of four, then when they are united, the system will move with a speed of less than eight; but the two stones when tied together make a stone larger than that which before moved with a speed of eight. Hence the heavier body moves with less speed than the lighter- an effect which is contrary to your supposition. Thus you see how, from your assumption that the heavier body moves more rapidly than the lighter one, I infer that the heavier body moves more slowly.22 Here the unstated auxiliary assumptions include ones such as the assumption that falling bodies in fact can be successfully united during a fall in the manner that Salviati describes. They also include the assumption that two stones, when joined together, make a single stone and thus have a natural speed which is comparable in principle to that of other stones. If we alter such assumptions even slightly, a different result occurs. As an example, let us postulate that upon further consideration Simplicio is unwilling to grant the empirical premise that two bodies will remain joined together throughout a fall. He is not at all confident that in the case where two objects are joined together they may not become detached at some point early in their fall. He may even postulate that this is as a result of the fact that the rapid one is being retarded by the slower, and that the slower is being hastened by the swifter. If knots in rope and the like regularly do come undone during a fall, one account of this might just be that the pre-Galilean theory was correct. The quite detailed discussion between Salviati and Simplicio regarding similar considerations shows that Galileo was sensitive to just this fact.23 The strength of the thought experiment depends crucially upon the relevancy of its unstated empirical assumptions. The lesson, of course, is that thought experiments, despite their power and versatility, are simply fallible. To the extent that they are employed for anything other than exploring the consequences of statements made within a particular observational and theoretical context, we run the risk of being misled.24